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I. INTRODUCTION
In 2005, the Republic of Serbia adopted three laws that collectively
represent major steps forward in its quest to establish a world-class banking
supervision regime: a new banking law, which took effect in phases in 2006;'
a new law on bankruptcy and liquidation of banks and insurance companies;
2
and a new law on deposit insurance.3 The Serbian Banking Law replaces the
previous, Milosevich-era banking law, under which the Serbian banking sector
previously operated,4 and reflects many international standards, especially
those of the European Union (EU) and the Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision (Basel Committee).5
This article will summarize the key provisions of the new bank
regulatory regime, focusing on the Serbian Banking Law and the Bank
Bankruptcy Law. It will indicate where the new regime fits in when evaluated
against pertinent EU provisions and the international best practices of banking
supervision, and will suggest some specific steps where further work is
necessary.
II. THE SERBIAN BANKING SECTOR
The Serbian banking sector is still relatively small, but has made
significant progress in recent years. Until the early 1990s, when Serbia was
still part of the wider Yugoslavia, the banking market was generally
considered quite progressive and liberal among socialist countries.6 During
the Milosevic era, under a blend of crony-capitalism and old-style socialism,
combined with the effects of war and geopolitical strife, Serbia's banking
'Law on Banks, RS Official Gazette No. 107/2005 (2005), available at
http://www.nbs.yu/english/regulations/index.htm [hereinafter Serbian Banking Law].
2 Law on Bankruptcy and Liquidation of Banks and Insurance Companies, RS
Official Gazette No. 61/2005 (2005) [hereinafter Bank Bankruptcy Law].
3 Law on Deposit Insurance, RS Official Gazette No. 61/2005 (2005)
[hereinafter Deposit Insurance Law].
4 Law on Banks and Other Financial Organizations (1993, as amended)
[hereinafter the 1993 Banking Law].
5 The Basel Committee is a committee of bank supervisory authorities from
Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Spain,
Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States. The Committee
provides a forum for cooperation on banking supervisory matters and the improvement
of the quality of banking supervision around the world. It normally meets at Basel,
Switzerland, at the headquarters of the Bank for International Settlements. Information
about the Basel Committee, and its various publications, can be accessed at its website,
http://www.bis.org/bcbs/index.htm.
6 See Marianne Kager and Sdndor Gard6, Due for Revival, THE BANKER, May 2,
2005, at 126.
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system was decimated through directed lending to inefficient state-owned
enterprises and Milosevic associates, and, in some cases, outright
embezzlement.7 As in many transition economies, extremely loose licensing
and capital requirements resulted in a plethora of banks, with the number
peaking at 112 in 1995.8 By the end of Milosevic's tenure as President, the
banking system consisted of approximately eighty-three licensed banks, many
of which were insolvent.
9
Following the ouster of Milosevic, the National Bank of Yugoslavia 0
sensed the opportunity to end years of isolation and, with the assistance and
support of international development organizations, moved quickly to clean up
the banking sector. In early 2001, diagnostic examinations of the country's
banks were undertaken. These examinations confirmed that many of the banks
had no further economic purpose, due to their legacy of non-performing assets,
inadequate human capital and technology, and lack of public trust." Given the
7 Id. See generally Aleksandar Pavic, Why is America Promoting Hague
Inquisition?, WORLDNET DAILY, April 8, 2002, available at
http://www.worldnetdaily.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLEID=27138; lan Traynor,
Search for the Missing Millions, THE GUARDIAN, March 29, "2001, available at
http://www.guardian.co.uk/yugo/article/0,2763,464934,00.html.
8 Kager and Gard6, supra note 6.
9Id.
10 Until 2003, Serbia and Montenegro comprised the last two remnants of
Yugoslavia, which had come into existence at the end of World War I and had
essentially ceased to exist by the early 1990s as its component republics declared their
independence. In March 2002, the federal parliament resolved to eliminate the name
"Yugoslavia" and to create a restructured federal union known as the State Union of
Serbia and Montenegro. A new constitution was approved in early 2003. The
country's central bank was known as the National Bank of Yugoslavia until 2003 and
has since been officially known as the National Bank of Serbia. For convenience, it is
generally referred to in this article as the National Bank of Serbia. In 2006, Serbia and
Montenegro each declared themselves sovereign independent countries. See Jovana
Gec, Serbia Declares Itself Sovereign State, WASH. POST. June 5, 2006, at 1; Serbia
Declares Sovereignty, BELGRADE METROPOLITAN EXECUTIVE NEWSLETTER, June 6,
2006, at 1; Predrag Milic, Montenegro Declares Independence From Serbia, WASH.
POST, June 4, 2006, at Al7; Montenegro Declares Independence, BELGRADE
METROPOLITAN EXECUTIVE NEWSLETTER, June 5, 2006, at 1. As a practical matter,
Montenegro had been operating largely on an independent basis for a number of years
even prior to its formal declaration of independence in June of 2006. It even
established its own central bank in 2000. See Official Website of the Central Bank of
Montenegro, http://wwwv.cb-mn.org.
" World Bank Report No. 29258-YIJ: Serbia and Montenegro - Republic of
Serbia. An Agenda for Economic Growth and Employment 80 (2004) [hereinafter
World Bank 2004 Report]. BearingPoint, Inc. (then known as Barents Group of
KPMG Consulting, Inc.) conducted the diagnostic assessments under the USAID bank
supervision project. The author provided legal support for the diagnostic team.
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inability of the budget to re-capitalize the more seriously distressed banks, and
the likely negative franchise value of most of them, some twenty-five
insolvent banks, representing nearly two-thirds of the assets of the banking
system, were closed over the next three years. 12 In early 2002, the National
Bank closed the country's four largest banks, which at the time represented
nearly 60% of total recorded banking assets at that time.' 3  The Bank
Rehabilitation Agency, later renamed the Deposit Insurance Agency, was
given extended authority to administer banks in bankruptcy. 14  A new
accounting law was enacted, making International Accounting Standards
(IAS) mandatory for banks beginning in 2003 and for all other companies in
2004."s
USAID has been providing assistance under a banking program since
2001. The program originally comprised two elements: a stabilization effort,
focused on the assessment and resolution of the twenty-seven largest banks
representing roughly 85% of banking sector assets; and a continuing program
which seeks to promote institutional and systemic reform and includes on-site,
off-site and special supervision. The over-arching objectives of both aspects of
this assistance have been to stabilize the financial system, and to promote
long-term safety and soundness through the adoption of prudential banking
practices. 16
Over the past several years, the situation has improved significantly.
The number of banks has steadily declined during the past five years as
insolvent banks have been closed.17 As of March 31, 2006, there were thirty-
nine licensed banks operating in Serbia.'8
In July 2002, to cover the resolution of Serbian banks' debts to their
Paris and London Club creditors the Government of Serbia initiated a debt-for-
12 id.
13 id.
14 Id at 95.
'5 Id. See Accounting and Auditing Law, FRY Official Gazette, No. 71/2002
(2002), art. 19, art. 44. There are still a number of issues connected with the actual
implementation of lAS. See SOUTHEAST EUROPE ENTERPRISE DEVELOPMENT,
FACTORING IN SERBIA: FEASIBILITY STUDY UPDATE 33-34 (February 2005), available at
www2.ifc.org/seed/PDFs/Factoring%20Feasibility%20study%20update%20Feb%2020
05.pdf.
16 USAID, Banking System Stabilization & Reform, supra note 7.
17 id.
18 National Bank of Serbia, Banking Sector in Serbia, First Quarter Report 3
(May 2006). available at http://www.nbs.yu/english/publications/index.htm
[hereinafter NBS First Quarter 2006 Report].
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equity swap. 19 This process culminated in July 2004, with the signing of a
"Memorandum of Understanding on the Debt Restructuring Under the NFA
and TDFA Between the Republic of Serbia and the International Coordinating
Committee," containing the following terms: (1) a write-off of approximately
62% of the debt; (2) a repayment period of twenty years; and (3) a grace
period of five years.20 In April 2005, Serbia issued a $1.02 billion bond to
conclude the debt-rescheduling deal reached in 2004.21 This was followed by
an additional $57 million bond issue in late September 2005, under the same
terms as the previously issued bonds.
22
European banks, sensing an opportunity for growth, rushed into the
Serbian market through a series of acquisitions. 23 The Serbian banking sector
is now dominated by foreign banks. Of the thirty-nine licensed banks, nearly
half (nineteen) are majority - owned by foreign shareholders.24 Raiffeissen,
with its parent bank based in Austria, is the country's largest bank. 25 Italy's
Banca Intesa, Greece's Alpha Bank, Piraeus Bank, and the National Bank of
Greece, Hypo Alpe-Adria Bank and France's Socidtd Gdndrale are also
significant players. 26 By contrast, only nine Serbian banks - less than a
quarter of the total - are majority owned by domestic shareholders, and eleven
are majority owned by the Republic of Serbia.27
The five largest banks hold 50% of the system's assets; the ten largest
banks have a 69% share. 28 As of March 31, 2006, the overall banking sector
balance sheet total stood at 850 billion CSD (Serbian dinars). Banks that are
' See World Bank 2004 Report, supra note 11. The "London Club" is a group of
the country's international banking creditors. For a short history of the country's
sovereign debt build-up, see Tania Jakobi, Case Study: Serbia and Montenegro
Sovereign Debt, INITIATIVE FOR POL'Y DIALOGUE, available at
http://www2.gsb.columbia.edu/ipd/jbankruptcyserbia.html (last visited Nov. 7,
2006).
20 NBS, Relations With London and Paris Club, available at
http://www.nbs.yu/english/5_6.htm (last visited Nov. 11, 2006).
21 See Confident Times, THE BANKER , May 2, 2005, at 118, available at
http://www.thebanker.com/news/fullstory.php/aid/2848/ZConfidenttimes.htm.
22 NBS, Relations With London and Paris Club, supra note 20.
23 Confident Times. supra note 21; Eric Jansson, Takeover Trend, THE BANKER,
May 2, 2005, at 122.
24 NBS First Quarter Report 2006, supra note 18, at 4. Foreign bank branches are
not permitted in Serbia. In order for a foreign bank to conduct banking business in
Serbia, it must establish a subsidiary.
25 Confident Times, supra note 2 1.
26 id.
27 NBS First Quarter 2006 Report, supra note 18, at 4.
28 Id.
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majority-owned by foreign entities hold 68.7% of this total. 29 The share held
by majority state-owned banks stood at CSD 198 billion, or 23.3%, while
banks in majority private domestic ownership accounted for CSD 68 billion, or
8%.30 The influx of foreign banks has led to a sharp increase in intermediation
of credit to the private sector, and. as a result, the financial sector is much
better able to support economic growth.31
The year 2006 has seen a CSD 48 billion (11%) increase in overall
lending activity of the banking sector.32 The greatest amount of lending is to
corporate customers (64.4%) and citizens (29.3%). 33 The highest percentage
of deposits consists of household deposits (43.8%), followed by corporate
deposits (22.2%) and bank deposits (16.4%). 34 Foreign exchange deposits
accounted for 72.3% of all banking sector deposits. 35 According to the NBS,
all licensed and actively operating banks meet the NBS capital adequacy
requirement as of March 31, 2006.36
Serbia achieved 8% growth in GDP in 2004, just behind Estonia.37
Unfortunately, however, the overall macroeconomic situation still presents
major challenges. Inflation is a significant problem, and the dinar is
depreciating, which discourages the use of local currency by individuals. As a
result, banks have problems in asset-liability management as large, short-term
foreign exchange deposits cannot be easily converted into long-term lending in
local currency.
38
The banking sector is supervised by the NBS.39 The NBS also has
responsibility for supervising the insurance and pension sectors under
legislation adopted in 2004.40
29 id.
30 id.
31 See Int'l Monetary Fund IMF Country Report No. 06/96 5 (March 2006),
available at http://www.imforg/.
32 NBS First Quarter 2006 Report, supra note 18, at 6.
33 Id.
34 id. at 7.
35 Id. at 8.
36 Id. at 11.37See Marcin Mazurek, Banking Market in Serbia 2006, CEE BANKING SERIES,
January 2006, at 4.
38 id.
39 Law on the National Bank of Serbia, Official Gazette of the RS No. 72/2003
(2003). as amended by Law Supplementing the Law on the National Bank of Serbia,
Official Gazette of the RS No. 55/2004 (2004) art. 4, 1 6.
40 See id.; Law on Insurance, Official Gazette of the RS No. 55/2004 (2004)
(Serb.); Law on Voluntary Pension Funds, Official Gazette of the RS No. 85/2005
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III. THE FRAMEWORK FOR REFORM
Serbia has aspired to EU membership since the end of the Milosevic
era. On September 4, 2002, the Serbian Government established the Council
for European Integration as a consultative government body.4' Its main tasks
are to monitor, review, evaluate and streamline the process of Serbia's
association to the EU and provide political support to the activities relating to
the process.42 The Council is comprised of a Prime Minister, Deputy Prime
Minister, Government Secretary General, eleven ministers and the Secretary
General of the European Integration Office. The Council is chaired ex officio
by the Prime Minister.43
On October 14, 2004, the Serbian parliament adopted a Resolution on
EU Accession, which clearly stated the commitment of Serbia to join the EU.44
This was followed up on June 29, 2005 by a similar resolution of the State
Union of Serbia and Montenegro. 45 The same month, Serbia adopted a
National Strategy for EU Accession.4 6 The listed priority items included
harmonization of Serbian legislation with that of the EU and improvements in
the banking system.
47
On April 12, 2005, the European Commission approved a Feasibility
Report, placing Serbia and Montenegro on a preliminary track for membership
of the EU, agreeing to launch negotiations on a "Stabilization and Association
Agreement" (SAA). 48  The SAA is the final stage of the EU's Stabilization
and Association Process (SAP), the EU's policy for the countries of the
Western Balkans region. The SAP is accompanied by a financial assistance
(2005) (Serb.). See generally Wolf Theiss, Serbia and Montenegro: Pension Funds to
Strengthen Capital Markets, 2006 INT'L FIN. L.R. 1 (2006).
41 See official website of the Council for EU Integration,
http://www.seio.sr.gov.yu/code/navigate.asp?Id=71 (last visited Nov. 7, 2006).
42 id.
43 id.
44 Resolution on Joining European Union (Oct.14, 2004), available at
http://www.seio.sr.gov.yu/code/navigate.asp?Id=102.
45 Resolution on Association of the State Union of Serbia & Montenegro with the
European Union (June 29, 2005), available at
http://www.yusurvey.co.yu/products/ys/showSummaryArticle.php?prodld=2067&grou
pld=6671.
4 National Strategy of Serbia for the Serbia and Montenegro's Accession to the
European Union (June 2005), available at
http://www.seio.sr.gov.yu/code/navigate.asp?Id=73
" Id. at 72-75 (banking), 139 (legislative harmonization).
48 Council for EU Integration, supra note 41. See also official website of the
Joint Office for South East Europe (World Bank and European Commission),
http://www.seerecon.org/gen/eu-see.htm (last visited Nov. 11, 2006).
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program; the Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and
Stabilisation (CARDS). The EU has SAAs with the former Yugoslav
Republics of Macedonia and Croatia, and through mid-2006 was negotiating
SAAs with Albania in addition to Serbia and Montenegro. A SAA creates a
contractual relationship between a country and the EU, and typically includes
provisions on the harmonization of the signatory country's laws with the
legislation of the EU.4 9 Banking legislation is specifically mentioned.50
On June 3, 2006, Montenegro declared independence from Serbia.f
Two days later, Serbia declared itself a separate sovereign state. 52 The EU is
now conducting SAA negotiations with Serbia and Montenegro separately.
53
Banking sector supervision reform is also a major topic of Serbia's
discussions with the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Pursuant to a
November 29, 2004 Letter of Intent, the NBS was obliged to substantially
strengthen financial sector supervision. In particular, the Letter of Intent
required the NBS to:
* group all banks and insurance companies according to
their respective risk assessment, with their supervisory
plans clearly laid out by end November 2004, and cross-
check banks' submitted reports against external audit
reports by end-2004;...
" [perform] an on-site assessment of the bank posing the
largest potential systemic risk . . . by end-2004, and
49 The texts of the existing SAAs are publicly available. See Stabilisation and
Association Agreement Between the European Communities and Their Member States
and the Republic of Croatia (July 9, 2001) arts. 69 and 84, available at
http://www.delhrv.cec.eu.int/en/eu and country/saa.pdf; Stabilisation and Association
Agreement Between the European Communities and Their Member States of the One
Part and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia of the Other Part (March 26,
2001), arts. 68 and 83, available at
http://www.delmkd.cec.eu.int/en/eu-and-fyrom/pdf/saa03_01.pdf. See also Action
Plan for the Approximation of Serbian Legislation With the European Union Law for
2005, available at http://www.seio.sr.gov.yu/code/navigate.asp?Id=76 [hereinafter
Action Plan 2005].
50 See Action Plan 2005, supra note 49.
51 See note 10, supra.
52 id.
53 See EU to Launch SAA Talks With Montenegro, BETA-MONITOR: SOUTHEAST
EUROPE ECONOMIC REVIEW, June 5, 2006, at 3; Serbia, Montenegro to Receive
Separate EU Negotiating Mandates (May 31, 2006) , available at
http://www.euractiv.com/en/enlargement/serbia-montenegro-receive-separate-eu-
negotiating-mandates/article-i 55693.
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[require] the bank. . . [to] adopt a time-bound plan by
end-2004 to strengthen internal controls and
governance....
* send a clear signal that regulatory forbearance is
ceasing, . . . [by] strengthening on-site and off-site
supervision, and strictly enforce existing regulations....
" withdraw the license of banks that do not meet the £10
million minimum capital requirement by end-2004,
unless they are recapitalized by reputable investors with
banking experience or meet the requirement through a
merger...
* [require] all banks, insurance and leasing companies...
[to] publish [financial results] complying with
International Accounting Standards (IAS) for 2004 by
the end of June 2005. 54
In drafting the new Serbian Banking Law, Serbia relied heavily on
the EU banking-related directives, notably the EU Banking Directive 55 and the
EU Financial Conglomerates Directive,56 while at the same time being careful
to avoid a simple "copy and paste" approach. The law is a blend of the
relevant EU directives and internal banking legislation of a number of more
advanced countries (notably Germany, Austria, Estonia, Croatia, Canada,
Australia and the United States) along with some uniquely Serbian provisions.
This approach to the EU directives is appropriate and practical. There is,
strictly speaking, no single "EU Banking Law," but rather a series of
directives, addressing specific legal issues to be implemented by the
governments of the Member States. The principal purpose of these directives
is not to provide a comprehensive "code" for banking regulation and
supervision, but rather to create certain minimum standards with the goal of
promoting free trade and the establishment of banking organizations
54 See Serbia and Montenegro - Letter of Intent. Memorandum of Economic and
Financial Policies, and Technical Memorandum of Understanding 27 (November 29,
2004), available at http://www.imf.org/Extemal/NP/LOI/2004/scg/02/index.htm.
55 Council Directive 2006/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council
of 14 June 2006 Relating to the Taking Up and Pursuit of the Business of Credit
Institutions (recast), 2006 O.J. (L 177/1 ) [hereinafter EU Banking Directive].
56 Council Directive 2002/87/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council
of 16 December 2002 On the Supplementary Supervision of Credit Institutions,
Insurance Undertakings, and Investment Firms in a Financial Conglomerate, 2003 O.J.
(L 35/1) [hereinafter EU Financial Conglomerates Directive].
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throughout the Member States.57 Specifically, this entails licensing and
supervision of banks only in their respective home countries, with certain
aspects of those items being harmonized throughout the EU so that a bank
licensed in one Member State will be free to provide banking services
throughout the EU under cooperation between the home and host country
supervisors. The directives' standards have been implemented in very
different ways in different EU Member States, which are in fact at very
different stages of development. Even prior to the admission of ten new
members in 2004, the EU ran the gamut from Great Britain, France and
Germany on one end to Ireland, Portugal and Greece on the other. Many
former Soviet-bloc states from Eastern Europe have now become members.
Even a cursory examination of the banking legislation of EU Member States
reveals wide disparities in the extent of incorporation of the directives'
provisions and terminology. The Member States have often varied the precise
wording of the directives while retaining their substance (and, in many cases,
have adopted stricter and more detailed requirements). The provisions of the
directives are quite valuable and on some topics perhaps even sufficient, but
they are far from exhaustive. Some topics that are critically important for
banking supervision are addressed only tangentially, or not at all, in the EU
directives.
The Banking Law thus incorporates material from a number of
countries that are particularly good supplements to the EU directives.
Germany and Austria offer good models because their banking laws follow
many of the provisions of the EU directives quite closely, though both laws are
probably more complex and detailed than necessary for Serbia at its present
stage of development. Estonia and Latvia, former Soviet republics that were
among the 2004 crop of new Member States, both have banking laws that
reflect many EU concepts. In particular, Estonia has taken many of the
concepts in the directives and written them in a less complex and more "user-
friendly" fashion that is suitable for a transition economy. From outside of
Europe, the banking legislation of Canada, Australia and the United States
contains much useful material that can effectively supplement the EU
materials and in some cases provide an alternative approach.
57 Most of the banking-related directives have been adopted on the basis of
provisions of the Treaty on Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25,
1957, O.J. (C 157) [hereinafter E.E.C. Treaty] providing for the freedom of
commencing and carrying out of independent professions.
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IV. HIGHLIGHTS OF THE NEW SERBIAN BANKING LEGISLATION
A. Bank Ownership and Control
1. Participation in Banks
Under the 1993 Banking Law, criteria for ownership and control of
banks were rather perfunctory and mechanical. Prospective founders of banks
were required to submit information about their credit ratings and mutual
proprietary and control relationships to the NBS as a condition of obtaining a
license.58 Similarly, persons who proposed to acquire more than 15% of the
shares of a bank had to receive the approval of the NBS. 59 It was not at all
clear, however, whether the NBS had the authority to scrutinize persons who
could, in fact, control a bank without some sort of formal share ownership.
Although the 1993 Banking Law defined an "acquirer" as including all
persons "related by proprietary and managing relations, 60 this could easily be
interpreted as focusing on formal share ownership rather than real influence or
control. For banking supervision purposes, the broader concept of "significant
influence" or "control" is much more relevant. It is quite possible, in practice,
for a person to exert considerable influence over a bank even in the absence of
formal share ownership or controlling rights (such as through surreptitious
arrangements with the actual shareholders and managers), and it is important
that such influence be subject to supervisory oversight.61
The new Serbian Banking Law is much clearer on issues of indirect
ownership and real influence. It incorporates the European concept of
"qualifying holdings," although the details differ slightly. Under the new
Banking Law, the NBS is concerned about bank ownership (or equivalent
influence) at three levels, all of which come under the heading of a
"participation:"
a "qualified participation," defined as:
1) direct or indirect right or ability to realize 5 percent
or more of voting rights of a legal entity, and/or
direct or indirect ownership of 5 percent or more of
capital of such legal entity; or
58 1993 Banking Law, supra note 4, art. 8.
59 id. at art. 12, 1.
60Id. at 2.
61 See Bryan D. Stirewalt and Gary A. Gegenheimer, Consolidated Supervision of
Banking Groups in the Former Soviet Republics: A Comparative Examination of the
Emerging Trend in Emerging Markets, 23 ANN. REv. BANKING AND FIN. L. 533, 553-54
(2004).
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2) the ability in fact to exercise influence over the
management of a legal entity or over the business
policy of such legal entity.
* a "significant participation," defined as:
I) direct or indirect right or ability to realize 20
percent or more of voting rights of a legal entity,
and/or direct or indirect ownership of 20 percent or
more of capital of such legal entity; or
2) the ability in fact to exercise influence over the
management of a legal entity or over the business
policy of such legal entity;62 and
0 a "controlling participation," defined as:
1) direct or indirect right or ability to realize 50
percent or more of voting rights of a legal entity,
and/or direct or indirect ownership of 50 percent or
more of capital of such legal entity;
2) the ability to elect at least half of the members of
the board of directors or other management body in
such legal entity; or
3) the ability in fact to exercise dominant influence
over the management of a legal entity or over the
business policy of such legal entity.63
Both the new Serbian Banking Law and the EU Banking Directive
thus frame the ownership/control issue in alternate terms of either formal share
ownership or actual control or influence, which is appropriate.64 The principal
differences between the Serbian and EU versions are that: (1) the Serbian law
adopts a stricter posture by lowering the ownership threshold for supervisory
approval to 5%, whereas the EU standard is 10%; and (2) the Serbian law does
not refer to "significant" influence, as the EU Banking Directive does, for
determining the existence of a qualified or significant participation; the ability
62 Serbian Banking Law, supra note I, art. 2
63 Id..
64 Compare EU Banking Directive, supra note 55, art. 4, 111 (defining a
"qualifying holding" in terms of either 10% ownership or the ability to exert a
"significant influence" over an undertaking); id., 9, 12, and 13 (defining "control"
in terms of 50% ownership or the ability to exert a "dominant influence").
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to exert any degree of influence over an entity - no matter how slight - is
sufficient to support a determination that the person in question holds a
qualified or significant participation in the entity, and if the entity is a bank or
controls a bank, the supervisory approval requirements become applicable.
The Serbian drafters did avoid one drafting mistake in the EU
formulation, which has long been one of this author's "pet peeves" with the-
EU approach:65 The EU Banking Directive defines a "qualifying holding" as:
"[A] direct or indirect holding in an undertaking which represents [ten] percent
or more of the undertaking's capital or voting rights, or which makes it
possible to exercise a significant influence over the management of the
undertaking in which a holding subsists. 66  Under this definition, the
"significant influence" test does not become applicable unless there is first a
"direct or indirect holding" in the bank. This could easily be interpreted as
requiring at least some formal share ownership, either directly or indirectly
through other entities, before a "significant influence" analysis could even be
considered. This approach is less than satisfactory. In this author's view, any
person who can significantly influence a bank should be regarded as having a
."qualifying holding" in that bank regardless of the size of that person's
ownership of a bank's capital or voting rights.67 Indeed, other parts of the EU
Banking Directive, as well as the Financial Conglomerates Directive,
expressly recognize that a person can exert a significant influence over an
entity without holding any participation or capital ties at all.68 The Serbian
Banking Law avoids this problem by defining "indirect ownership" as "the
ability in fact to realize ownership rights in such entity using ownership that
another person directly has in such legal entity., 69 This is roughly akin to the
concept of "beneficial ownership" which is used in the Canadian Bank Act and
many other banking or financial laws and literature around the world.70
On the other hand, the Serbian Banking Law does complicate things
in another respect. For some reason, the drafters chose to use the
65 See Stirewalt and Gegenheimer, supra note 61, at 566.
66 EU Banking Directive, supra note 55, art. 4, 11.
67 Such terminology is used in the German and Swiss banking acts. See "Gesetz
fiber das Kreditwesen" § 1(9) (F.R.G.)[hereinafter German Banking Act], available at
http://www.bundesbank.delbank/download/pdflkwg_e.pdf (defining "qualifying
participating interest"); Federal Law on Banks and Savings Banks, art. 3, para. 2 c bis
(Switz.) [hereinafter Swiss Banking Act] (referring to a "qualified participation").
(8 See EU Banking Directive, supra note 55, art. 134, I(a); EU Financial
Conglomerates Directive, supra note 56, art. 5 4.
69 Serbian Banking Law. supra note I. art. 2.
70 See, e.g., Canadian Bank Act, R.S.C. ch. 46 § 2 (2006)(defining "beneficial
ownership" as "includ[ing] ownership through one or more trustees, legal
representatives, agents or other intermediaries.").
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"participation" terminology in the licensing sections, which pertain to
establishment of new banks, 71 but phrase other requirements in terms of
ownership. Thus, Article 94 provides that'"[n]o person may acquire direct or
indirect ownership in the bank which provides 5% to 20%, over 20% to 33%,
over 33% to 50% and over 50% of voting rights, without the prior consent
granted by the National Bank of Serbia." 72 These requirements generally track
the EU's progressive scale of supervisory scrutiny of ownership or influence
over a bank.73 Given the "indirect ownership" definition, which clearly is the
equivalent of the "participation" definition, the intent is clear enough, yet the
drafters chose to use the "ownership" phrasing in certain key places. To
complicate things further, Section 1 of Chapter V of the Law is actually
entitled "Participation in a Bank," but some of the provisions refer to
"participation" and some to "ownership." While the two concepts are largely
interchangeable, the law would be easier to follow if one phrasing was used
consistently.
2. Criteria for Approval: "Fit and Proper" Persons
The new Banking Law improves considerably the criteria for
approval of persons to become participants in banks. Previously, the only
standard mentioned for receiving NBS approval was the proposed founder's or
acquirer's credit rating.74 However, much more than this is needed. The Basel
Committee emphasizes that significant shareholders of banks must be "fit and
proper" persons as well as financially stable. 75 The banking laws of Basel
Committee countries, as well as a number of other countries that have
71 See Serbian Banking Law, supra note 1, art. 15, 1 1(5) (requiring the
submission of data on all persons expected to have a participation in a newly-licensed
bank). The exact nature of this data is not specified, which leaves the NBS the
flexibility to determine what information must be submitted. See id. at art. 15 , 6
(providing that the NBS "may prescribe detailed requirements and manner of acquiring
the preliminary approval.").
7 Id.at art. 94, I.
73 See EU Banking Directive, supra note 55, art. 19, 1.
74 1993 Banking Law, supra note 4, art. 8, art. 12.
75 See BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, CORE PRINCIPLES
METHODOLOGY II (October 2006), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsl30.htm
[hereinafter CORE PRINCIPLES METHODOLOGY];. The Core Principles Methodology is a
set of guidelines to assist countries in assessing compliance with the Basel Committee's
Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision [hereinafter Core Principles], which
were originally published in 1997 and updated in October 2006. The Core Principles,
which have become the de facto international standard for the sound prudential
regulation and supervision of banks, are available at the website of the Basel
Committee on Banking Supervision, http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsI29.htm.
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patterned their banking laws after the Basel Committee's recommendations,
reflect this emphasis.
7 6
The new Serbian Banking Law expands the criteria considerably and
now is much more aligned with international practice. Key persons in banks,
such as members of the board of directors, executive board, and persons with
"participations" in the bank, must have an "appropriate business reputation,"
which allows the NBS to make discretionary determinations about a person's
business background. 7
B. Risk Management
To a much greater extent than the previous law, the new law
emphasizes risk management in banks. The 1993 Banking Law mentioned
risk only in scattered places, most of them in articles having to do with the
capital adequacy ratio, mandatory reserves, deposit insurance, or various
penalties.78 Only one article in the 1993 law specifically mentioned the
concept of risk management: a prospective bank's memorandum of
association had to include the bank's proposals for bearing risks and covering
losses. 79 Most of the items in the memorandum of association pertain to the
basic structure and methods of organizing the bank; risk management
techniques are more usually the subject of ongoing operation. In addition, the
1993 Banking Law required that any-amendments to a bank's memorandum of
76 See German Banking Act (2001), available at
http://www.iuscomp.org/gla/statutes/KWG.htm#III('"trustworthiness"); Estonian
Credit Institutions Act (1999), available at
http://www.legaltext.ee/text/en/X30042k9.htm ("impeccable business reputation"). See
also Netherlands Financial Supervisory Authority, Policy Rule on Integrity Testing
(2005), available at http://wwv.afm.nl/marktpartijen/default.ashx?Documentld=2955.
77 Serbian Banking Law, supra note 1, art. 15, 7 6, art. 16, T 2, 3, art. 71, 5,
art. 72, 77 1, 2, 3 and 8, art. 75, T 5, art. 94, 7 3, and art. 96.
78 See, e.g., 1993 Banking Law, supra note 4, art. 26, 2(2) (referring to capital
adequacy calculations based on risk-weighted assets), art. 27 (requiring that banks
maintain the volume and structure of their risk-weighted investments within the ratios
prescribed by the NBS), art. 31 (referring to risk-based deposit insurance premiums),
art. 55 (requiring the formation of reserves to cover operating risks), art. 57e, 2 (3)
(authorizing the NBS to issue a corrective decision to a bank requiring it to maintain
capital of at least 8% of risk-weighted assets), art. 57f (authorizing the NBS Governor
to place a bank under NBS administration if its capital fell below 4% of risk-weighted
assets), and art. 78, 1(16) (imposing monetary penalties for failure to maintain capital
at the prescribed ratio of risk-weighted assets).
79 See id. at art.6, point 9.
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association had to be approved by the NBS, which made it difficult for a bank
to adapt its risk management practices to changing circumstances.
80
The new law leaves no room for doubt that risk management is the
name of the game. An application for preliminary approval to establish a new
bank must inchdde a description of the proposed procedures for risk
management and internal controls,8' and the application may be denied if the
NBS. is not satisfied as to their quality. -82 An entire section of the law is
devoted to risk management. 83 Each bank is obligated to identify, measure
and assess the risks to which it is exposed in its business activities, and to
manage such risks.84  In addition, each bank must form a special
organizational unit, the competence of which includes risk management. 85
Risk management is tailored to the circumstances of the individual bank: the
size and organizational structure of the bank, the volume of operations, and the
86types of activities. Each bank is specifically required to adopt policies and
procedures governing liquidity risk;87 credit risk;88  interest rate, foreign
exchange and other market risks; 89 exposure of the bank to one person or a
group of related persons;90 risks relating to investments in other legal entities
and in fixed assets;91 country risk;92 and operational risk.
93
C. Bank Corporate Governance
One of the principal areas in which the new law improves upon the
previous situation is in the area of bank corporate governance. The law makes
it clear that the ultimate responsibility for the sound and prudent management
of a bank is on the board of directors, and specifies the role and functions of
the board.94 The law also mandates a suitable system of internal controls in
each bank, 95 and requires an annual risk management report from each bank on
8 0 See id. at art. 28, 1.
81 Serbian Banking Law, supra note 1, art 15, 1, point 8.
2 Id. at art 16.83 Id. at Ch. Il, section 2.
8 Id. at, art. 28, 1.
85 Id. at §2.
86 Id. at §3.
87 Id. at arts. 29, 30.
881d. at arts. 29, 31.
89 Id. at arts. 29, 32.
90 Id. at arts. 29, 33.
91 Id. at arts. 29, 34.
92 Id. at art. 29.
93 Id. at arts. 29, 35.
94 Id. at art. 73.
9' Id. at art. 82.
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the effectiveness of these items.96 In a few areas, however, remnants of the old
system remain.
1. Governance Structure
Under the previous law, the governance structure in banks was rather
cumbersome. There were two non-executive boards in a bank: the
"management board" and the "supervisory board. 97 Both of these boards
were elected by the shareholders. These boards did not have the same
connotation as in many Continental European countries, where the two-board
structure is common. In a typical European country, especially German and
German-influenced countries, there is a "supervisory board," which is elected
by the shareholders (though it may include employee representatives as well),
and it performs approximately the same function as the board of directors in
the Anglo-American system.98 The "management board" is elected by the
supervisory board and consists of the full-time senior management of a
company. A major difference between the European (or, perhaps more
accurately, German) model and the Anglo-American model is that typically in
the European/German model the supervisory board contains no full-time
senior managers, whereas in the Anglo-American system the board of
directors will often include at least some members of senior management
(though usually less than a majority). 99
In Serbia, the supervisory board is not simply a variation on the board
of directors; it is a separate body elected by the shareholders, the purpose of
which appears to be to "keep an eye" on the board of directors and
management board, to make sure they are doing their jobs properly, and to
make sure the financial and accounting functions are performed properly, etc.
While the historical foundations of the supervisory board are not entirely clear,
it seems to have originated in socialist times as a means of ensuring control by
the state, and in particular ensuring that state-owned enterprises did not
become too "entrepreneurial." Similar boards are still found in the banking
and corporate laws of many former communist countries. Often this body is
96 Id. at art. 87. This requirement is based on a similar provision in U.S. law. See
12 U.S.C. § 1831m(b).
97 1993 Banking Law, supra note 4.
98 See generaly Diane K. Denis and John J. McConnell, International Corporate
Governance 7-8. European Corporate Governance Institute Finance Working Paper No.
05/2003 (January 2003); Theodor Baums, Professor, J.W. Goethe University; Fellow,
European Corporate Governance Institute, Crafoord Lecture: Corporate Governance
Systems in Europe: Differences and Tendencies of Convergence (August 1996); CORE
PRINCIPLES METHODOLOGY, supra note 75 at 15, n.1 6.
99 Denis and McConnell, supra note 98.
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called the "revision commission" or something similar.100 This board, or
committee, combines certain functions normally found in an audit committee
with those normally found in a board of directors. This concept is still
contained in the Serbian Companies Law.1
01
1oo See, e.g., Law of Ukraine on Banks and Banking (2001), art. 44 ("revision
commission"); (former) Law on Banks and Banking in the Kyrgyz Republic (1997) art.
24 ("revision commission"); Moldovan Banking Law, art. 20 (referring to an "audit
committee" that nominally reports to the board of directors, but is in fact elected by the
shareholders and the functions of which can be delegated to an outside audit firm other
than the bank's designated external auditor). See also Russian Law on Joint Stock
Companies, art. .85 (referring to an "audit commission" elected by the general
shareholders' meeting). In Russia this body is often also called the "revision
commission." See Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, White
Paper on Corporate Governance in Russia 28, 147,April 24, 2002, available at
www.oecd.org.
101 The Law on Business Companies requires that listed companies have either an
audit committee, an internal auditor, or a supervisory board. Serbian Law on Business
Companies, art. 332, 1(l). A company must have a supervisory board if a law other
than the Law on Business Companies requires that it have a supervisory board because
of its activities. Id. at 7(2). There is no such requirement for closed companies, but the
company's articles of association or by-laws may provide that the company will have
an internal auditor or an audit committee. Id. at (3). Under the Law on Business
Companies, the supervisory board is appointed by the shareholders' assembly. .Id. at
art. 333, 11(2). A member of a supervisory board may not be a member of the board of
directors, and all supervisory board members must be independent as defined in the
Law on Business Companies. Id. at 7(1). The supervisory board, audit committee, or
internal auditor reports to the shareholders' assembly on the following: 1) the
accounting, reporting and financial practices of the company and its related companies;
2) the company's compliance with legal and regulatory requirements; 3) the
qualifications, independence and performance of the company's independent auditor;
and 4) contracts between the company and members of the board of directors and
persons related to them. I. at art. 335, (1). They also review and discuss with the
board of directors and the company's outside auditor when appropriate, matters relating
to 1) the selection, compensation and oversight of the work of the outside auditor; 2)
the adequacy and completeness of the annual and other financial statements of the
company and the basis for proposals for distribution of profit and other distributions to
shareholders: 3) the adequacy and completeness of the company's disclosure of
financial and other information to the shareholders; 4) conformity of the organization
and activities of the company with the corporate governance guidelines; 5) the
adequacy of the company's policies and procedures for legal compliance; and 6)
procedures for handling any complaints from shareholders, governmental bodies or
other persons concerning the foregoing. Id. at !(2). As is readily apparent, the
functions of the supervisory board, audit committee or internal auditor under the Law
on Business Companies are functions for which, under modem corporate governance
principles, the board of directors is entirely responsible. Compare ORGANISATION FOR
20071
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The text of the previous law was somewhat confusing as to the
respective functions of the two boards, and did not clearly differentiate their
functions. For example, Article 44 of the 1993 law provided that the
management board was the "controlling organ" of the bank. 10 2 However,
Article 47 provided that the supervisory board "monitored and controlled" the
activities of the bank's management board, manager, and employees.
0 3
Moreover, Article 48 assigned to the supervisory board the task of notifying
the NBS about deficiencies discovered in the bank's operations, and
suggesting to the bank's bodies ways of elimination of such deficiencies.'
4
Thus, it was not clear from the text of the law which of the two boards was
really the controlling body. In practice this led to confusion and lack of
accountability, as it was not clear which body was ultimately responsible for
the safe and sound operation of the bank.
Both Article 45 and Article 47 of the previous law contained
provisions for the respective boards presenting reports and findings to the
shareholders, but the law was not clear as to the difference between the two
kinds of reports. 0 5 Thus, Article 45 provided that the board of directors
scheduled sessions of the shareholders' meeting, prepared proposals for the
shareholders, and implemented their decisions, 10 6 while Article 47 provided
that the supervisory board notified the shareholders' meeting of its findings
(apparently after considering decisions made by the bank's organs and
auditors' reports), and could schedule a special shareholders' meeting to
suggest ways to remedy deficiencies. 0 7 It was thus unclear which board was
ultimately responsible for reporting to the shareholders and taking action to
implement decisions to improve the bank's operations. Finally, some of the
functions specified in Articles 47 and 48 for the supervisory board seemed
better suited to an audit committee. 08
The bottom line is that the board structure was considerably more
complicated than it needed to be, and did not clearly delineate accountability
and responsibility for sound and prudent bank management. The new law
institutes a simpler and more streamlined approach, much more in line with
modem corporate governance principles, which clearly sets out the structure
ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
(2004), Principle 59 [hereinafter OECP PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE].
102 1993 Banking Law, supra note 4, at art. 44, para. I.
'03 Id. at art. 47.
o4 Id. at art. 48.
105 Id. at art. 45 and art. 47.
106 Id. at art. 45.
'07 Id. at art. 47.
108 See, e.g., 1993 Banking Law, supra note 4, at art. 47.3 (consideration of
auditors' reports), and art. 48.1&3 (suggesting means of eliminating deficiencies).
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and functions of the board of directors, senior management, and the audit
committee.
One area in which the new law falls a bit short is shareholder rights.
Under the new law, a bank's articles of association may not preclude direct
exercising of voting rights of shareholders holding 1% or more of voting
shares.'0 9 The implication is that a bank may preclude shareholders with less
than 1% ownership from voting, which is contrary to the "one-share, one vote"
principle. 1 0
2. The Board of Directors and Audit Committee Under the New Law
The board of directors of a bank must consist of not less than five
members, including the president of the board. 1' At least one-third of
members of the board of directors of a bank must be persons independent of
the bank, meaning that this person cannot hold any direct or indirect
ownership in the bank or in a member of the bank's banking group."
2
Members of the board must have an appropriate business reputation and
qualifications, which are prescribed by the NBS.113 At least three members of
the board must have the appropriate experience in the field of finance. 114 At
least one member must be fluent in the Serbian language and have permanent
residence in the Republic of Serbia.' 15 The bank's board of directors meets
when needed, and at least quarterly.16
These provisions clearly are a vast improvement over the previous
law. Still, some areas are not entirely satisfactory.
The concept of board member independence is one upon which there
is substantial agreement in mainstream corporate governance circles.' 17 The
problem with the Serbian Banking Law is that it takes the concept to an
extreme. Any direct or indirect share ownership in the bank precludes a person
from being considered independent - and this is only a minimum
109 Serbian Banking Law, supra note 1, at art. 65.
110 See OECD PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 101, at 41
(noting that all shareholders within a class should be treated equally, though not
specifically taking a position on the "one share, one vote" principle).
111 Serbian Banking Law, supra note 1, at art. 71(1).
112 Id. at art. 71, 12, 3. See also id. at art. 2 (defining "banking group").
113 Id. at art. 71, 5.
114 Id. at art. 71, 6.
"15Id. at art. 71, 7.
6 ld. at art. 74, 1.
.17 See, e.g., OECD, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 101, at
52; NYSE Listed Co. Manual § 303A.01 (Nov. 4 2003).
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requirement.'Is In fact, there is no requirement that any of the board members
own any shares. It is thus quite possible that the entire board could be
comprised of persons with absolutely no connection to the bank except that
they have been "hired" by the shareholders. This could easily lead to a
situation where the board is comprised of "directors who do not direct" -
people who serve on the board for "prestige," or as a convenient means of
supplementing their income, but do not actually do anything. This is a serious
problem in transition economies, and one that the Serbian Banking Law,
unfortunately, helps to perpetuate.
It is now widely recognized that having bank directors with
significant amounts of their own money at risk is a good thing. Such owners
want a financial return from the bank that compensates them for the risk of
their equity position. Because they have their own investment at risk, they
have a strong incentive to watch senior management carefully in order to
ensure that the managers are acting in a way that will enhance the bank's
financial performance. By contrast, where members serve on a board for
"prestige" reasons and, "do not have serious amounts of their own money at
risk, they tend not to look over management's shoulder the same way business
investors do." ' 19 Recognizing this principle, some countries, including the
United States, require directors to have a prescribed amount of ownership in
their banks, either directly or through the bank's parent holding company.'20
At the same time, many countries require that a certain percentage of
a board's membership be comprised of "independent," or outside directors,
and prescribe an ownership threshold above which a director is not considered
"independent." Often these thresholds are rather low (5% or 10% is fairly
typical),' 21 but few, if any, advanced countries completely preclude a person
11 Serbian Banking Law, supra note 1, art. 71, para. 3.
119 See Robert Peck Christen & Richard Rosenberg, The Rush to Regulate: Legal
Frameworks for Microfinance, CGAP Occasional Paper, No. 4, April 2000, at 6,
available at http://www.cgap.org/docs/OccasionalPaper 04.pdf. See also United
Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 2003, Selected Issues in Corporate
Governance: Regional and Country Experiences UNCTAD /ITE/TEB/2003/3 at 7.
120 U.S. National Bank Act, 12 U.S.C.A. § 72 (2000). But see Canadian Bank
Act, supra note 70, § 161 (no shareholding requirement for directors of banks); § 751
(same principle for directors of bank holding companies).
1 'For example, § IOA of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, as amended
by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, requires that members of the audit committee of a
listed company be independent, meaning, inter alia, that the director cannot be an
"affiliated person" of the company. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78j-1 (2002). An "affiliated person"
under section 3 of the Exchange Act, which incorporates section 2(a)(3) of the
Investment Company Act of 1940, uses a 5% threshold. Id. at § 78c. In Canada, no
more than two thirds of the members of a bank's board of directors may be persons
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from being considered independent simply because he or she owns a
minuscule amount of company stock. Even the Serbian Law on Business
Companies uses a ten percent threshold.
22
Another issue concerns the frequency of board meetings. The
requirement for quarterly board meetings 123 is not unreasonable. A number of
mainstream countries have such a requirement. 24 Still, there is a legitimate
question as to whether quarterly meetings are really sufficient. Particularly in
a transition economy, where a strong corporate governance culture has yet to
take hold, there is a real possibility that the legal minimum will become the de
facto maximum - in other words, that bank boards may meet quarterly more
out of a need to satisfy the legal requirement for a specified number of
meetings than genuine concern for good management. In a number of these
banks, monthly meetings may in fact be necessary. For this reason, it might be
more appropriate to require monthly, rather than quarterly meetings.1
25
The Serbian Banking Law borrows a provision from the Canadian
Bank Act that has the potential to contribute toward a strong bank corporate
governance culture; each bank's annual report to the NBS must indicate the
total number of meetings the bank's board of directors held for the previous
year and the location where they were held. 126 Unfortunately, this provision is
incomplete; the idea is not simply to notify the NBS as to how many meetings
were held and where, but also which directors actually attended those
meetings, along with similar information on meetings of board committees.
27
"affiliated with the bank." Canadian Bank Act, supra note 70, at § 163(I). An
exception is allowed for banks that are wholly-owned subsidiaries of Canadian
financial institutions. Id. at § 163(2). A person is considered to be "affiliated with the
bank" if has a "significant interest" in a class of shares of the bank (defined as
beneficial ownership exceeding 10%). See id. at § 8(1); Canadian Office of the
Superintendent of Financial Institutions Regulation 92-325, Affiliated Persons (Banks)
Regulations; Circumstances Under Which a Natural Person is Affiliated; SOR/92-325,
§ 3 (Can) available at http://laws.justice.gc.ca/en/b-l.01/sor-92-325/text.html. See
generally INTERNATIONAL FINANCE CORPORATION, RUSSIA CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
MANUAL 200 n. 142 (2004), available at
www.ita.doc.gov/goodgovemance/adobe/CGMEnPart 6/a 18.pdf.
122 Serbian Law on Business Companies, supra note 101, art. 313(2),(5).
123 Serbian Banking Law, supra note 1, art. 74, para. 1.
124 See Canadian Bank Act, supra note 70, § 180(1); Estonian Credit Institutions
Act, supra note 76 § 54(1); Austrian Code of Corporate Governance (2002), 36,
available at http://www.ecgi.org/codes/documents/cgcode-en.pdf.
125 Indeed, the audit committee is required to meet monthly. See Serbian Banking
Law, supra note 1, art. 74, 1.
126 Id. at art. 74, 6.
127 Compare Canadian Bank Act, supra note 70, § 186(2). See also id. at art.
776(2) (bank holding companies). Note, however, that the Canadian Act requires such
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In this way, the NBS would receive a clear idea as to which directors are
taking their duties seriously.
Another area in which the vestiges of the old system have not been
completely eliminated involves the audit committee. The new law eliminates
the supervisory board and contains a requirement that each bank have an audit
committee. 128 Article 80 is patterned after Section 247 of the Canadian Bank
Act, which in this author's opinion is the best legislative provision on the
structure and functions of audit committees in banks. Nevertheless, the
Serbian law is not entirely satisfactory.
The audit committee consists of at least three members, at least two
of which are members of the bank's board of directors who have the
appropriate experience in the field of finance. 29 This is positive. However, at
least one member of the committee must be a person who is "independent" of
the bank, meaning that he or she cannot have any direct or indirect ownership
in the bank and/or in any member of the bank's banking group - let alone be a
director of the bank. 130 The new law thus does not entirely rid the legal
structure of the remaining relics of the old supervisory board - there is still a
mandatory outside presence on the audit committee, which logically should be
entirely the domain of the board of directors.
.Members of the audit committee cannot be persons related to the
bank, except by virtue of their membership in the board of directors of the
bank or the management and/or supervisory bodies of a component entity of
the same banking group. The committee assists the bank's board of directors
in supervising activities of the executive board and employees of the bank. In
particular, the committee must:
(1) Analyze annual and other financial statements of a
bank, which are submitted for review and adoption to
the bank's board of directors;
information to be furnished to the bank or holding company's shareholders in
connection with the annual meeting. In this author's view, it would also be wise to
require that this information be furnished to the bank supervisory authority. "Sunlight
is said to be the best of disinfectants; electric light the most efficient policeman." See
LoUis BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY, AND How BANKERS USE IT 92 (1933).
128 For convenience, this article refers to this committee as the "audit committee."
In the text of the Serbian Banking Law, Article 80 refers to the committee as the "Audit
Committee (Committee for Monitoring the Business Activities of the Bank)" and then
proceeds to repeat the longer designation - rather than use the shorter version - every
time it refers to the committee.
19 Serbian Banking Law, supra note 1. art. 80, 1.
3 0 Id. at 2. See id. at art. 71.
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(2) Analyze and adopt draft policies and procedures of a
bank regarding risk management and the system of
internal controls, which are submitted for review and
adoption to the bank's board of directors;
(3) Analyze and supervise implementation and adequate
enforcement of adopted policies and procedures for risk
management and the implementation of the system of
internal controls;
(4) At least once per month report to the board of directors
on its activities and detected irregularities, and give
suggestions for the manner in which the detected
irregularities will be eliminated, and/or the manner of
improvement of policies and procedures for risk
management and the implementation of the system of
internal controls;
(5) Review investments and activities of the bank, upon
proposal of the board of directors or executive board or
external auditor of the bank;
(6) Give proposal regarding the external auditor of a bank
to the bank's board of directors and assembly;
(7) Review annual audits of the financial statements of the
bank with the bank's external auditor;
(8) Suggest to the board of directors that certain issues
pertaining to the bank's external and internal audit be
included into the agenda for the assembly meeting;
[and]
(9) Render [a] rulebook of its activities.131
Should the committee determine that the bank's operations are in
breach of the law, other regulations, articles of association or other enactment
of the bank, or if that can be concluded from the auditor's report, and/or if it
establishes other irregularities in the bank's business activities, the committee
must suggest to the bank's board of directors ways to eliminate the detected
irregularities. 1'3 2  It may also call an extraordinary meeting of the bank's
"' id. at art. 80, 5.
132 Id. at 6.
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shareholders' assembly if it determines irregularities that may have severe
consequences regarding business activities of the bank. 1
33
The committee meets at least once a month, and at least quarterly at
the bank's head office. 134 This is an effective means of ensuring that the
committee members, who in Serbian banks are likely to be from other
countries due to the large amount of foreign ownership in the Serbian banking
sector, maintain a reasonable degree of contact with their banks and
management.
3. Bank Management
The previous Banking Law provided for one manager. 135 However,
both the EU and the Basel Committee emphasize that even in very small
banks, key management decisions should be made by more than one person
(the "four eyes principle"). 36 The manager was also appointed by, and
reported to, the shareholders' meeting, which was cumbersome. 137 In the
event of a manager's departure from office, it was necessary to hold a special
meeting of the shareholders to appoint a new manager. This provision also
meant that the manager was appointed by a body with no business experience,
or any fiduciary obligation to act in the best interest of the bank. There were
no real "fit and proper" requirements for bank managers; the only thing
resembling a fitness test was the requirement that the prospective manager
must not have been convicted of a crime against the economy or involving a
breach of his official duty. 138 The previous law also contained only a short and
perfunctory list of duties of the manager. The manager was authorized to:
(1) Represent and act on behalf of the bank;
(2) Execute the decisions of the bank's assembly,
management board and supervisory board;
(3) Organize the activity and manage the operations
of the bank;
133id.
134 Id. at j 7. Note that while the audit committee must meet monthly, the board
of directors is obliged to meet only quarterly. See id. at art. 1.
135 1993 Banking Law, supra note 4, at art. 49.
136 EU Banking Directive, supra note 55, at art. 11, 11 1; BASEL COMMITTEE. CORE
PRINCIPLES METHODOLOGY, supra note 75, at 28.
137 1993 Banking Law, supra note 4, at art. 49.
13s id.
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(4) Decide on all the matters that are not within the
terms of reference of the bank's assembly,
management board and supervisory board. 1
39
The new law requires an executive board in each bank and is much
more detailed on the duties and responsibilities of management. Under the
new law, a bank's executive board must have at least two members, following
the EU requirement. 140 All members of the management team must have a
good business reputation. 14' Management is required to:
(1) Carry out the decisions of the bank's assembly and
board of directors;
(2) Ensure legal compliance of the bank's activities;
(3) Make decisions regarding placements and indebtedness
of the bank up to the amount determined by the bank's
board of directors;
(4) Make decisions on any increase of exposure of the bank
to a person related to the bank and inform the bank's
board of directors of that;
(5) Implement the business strategy of the bank;
(6) Identify and measure risks the bank is exposed to in its
business activities, and implement principles of risk
management approved by the bank's board of directors;
(7) Render the organizational structure of the bank that is
suitable for the bank's strategy;
(8)" Implement procedures of supervision of the bank's
activities, regularly evaluate their quality and improve
"39 Id. at art. 50.
140 Serbian Banking Law, supra note 1, at art. 75, 1.
141 Actually, the law arrives at this requirement in a rather convoluted fashion:
Article 75 states that members of the board of directors must have a good business
reputation and appropriate qualifications as prescribed by the NBS. Serbian Banking
Law, supra note 1, at art. 75, 5. Per its title, however, that article is about the
executive board, not the board of directors. Id. Query, then, what the requirement as to
board of director membership is doing in article 75. Executive board members are
subject to the same procedural requirements as to their appointment as members of the
board of directors - in both cases NBS approval is necessary. Id. at art. 75, 7; art. 72,
1. In either case, an appropriate business reputation is necessary. Id.
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them, if necessary, in accordance with the business
policy of the bank;
(9) Ensure that all employees of the bank are aware of the
regulations and other enactments of the bank regulating
their business duties;
(10)Ensure safety and regular monitoring of the bank's
information technology systems;
(1l)Ensure safety and regular monitoring of systems
regarding treasury activities;
(12) Inform the board of directors of all activities which are
not in compliance with regulations and other enactments
of the bank;
(13) Present an overview of business activities, balance sheet
and income statement of the bank to the bank's board of
directors at least once during each business quarter;
(14) Promptly inform the bank's board of directors and the
National Bank of Serbia of any deterioration of the
financial situation of the bank, or the existence of the
danger of such deterioration, as well as other facts that
may significantly affect the financial situation of the
bank;
(15)Make decisions regarding any issues that are not in
competence of the bank's assembly and board of
directors of the bank. 
142
4. Fiduciary Duties of Managers and Board Members
The 1993 law contained an extremely skeletal statement of the
fiduciary duties of bank directors and managers. Article 41(a) provided that
members of the management board and supervisory board of a bank, as well as
the managing director of the bank, had to indemnify the bank in the event that
they did any of the following acts in contravention of the Banking Law:
0 returned investments to the shareholders;
142 Id. at art. 76. para. 2. These provisions are based on the parallel sections of
the Estonian Credit Institutions Act. See Estonian Credit Institutions Act, supra note
76, art. 55, 2.
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* acquired their own shares;
* distributed [the bank's] profits; or
* decreased the bank's share capital.'
43
Article 41(b) provided that these persons were liable for damages arising
in cases determined by the Banking Law and the bank's articles of
association.'"
The new law does not contain a specific fiduciary duty standard, but
incorporates the standard from the new Law on Business Companies. 145 That
law contains duties of care and loyalty that are, at least on paper, in line with
modem corporate governance principles. 46  As a practical matter, however,
much work remains to be done in this area. The World Bank and the IMF, in
their recent Financial Sector Assessment Report, found that corporate
governance practices were still poor, especially in domestic banks.1
47
5. Transactions with Related Persons
The 1993 law prohibited banks from extending credits to their
shareholders until at least one year after the bank has been entered in the court
register.' 48 There was also a limitation of 5% of a bank's capital on credit to:
any bank shareholder, persons connected to shareholders by ownership and
controlling rights or member of the bank's governing bodies. 149  These
provisions were clearly desirable, but more was necessary. Banks were
permitted to engage in a number of kinds of activities,' 50 and it is important
that bank insiders not receive preferential treatment.
In addition, the "ownership or controlling rights" phrasing was
problematic. This required some degree of share ownership or a formal
contractual agreement on the management of an entity before an arrangement
143 1993 Banking Law, supra note 4, art. 4 1(a).
14 Id. at art. 41(b).
145 Serbian Banking Law, supra note 1, art. 3.
146 Law on Business Companies, supra note 101, art. 32 (duty of care and
business judgment rule), art. 33 (duty of loyalty).
147 See World Bank, Financial Sector Assessment Program, Serbia 40
(November 2005), available at
wblnOO18.worldbank.org/FPS/fsapcountrydb.nsf/(attachmentwebFSA)/SERBIAFSA
web.pdf/SFILE/SERBIAFSAweb.pdf.
148 1993 Banking Law, supra note 4, art. 21(a).
14 Id. at art. 26.
15 Id. at arts. 21, 22.
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fell within the ambit of Article 26. However, as noted above, it is quite
possible, in practice, for a person to exert considerable influence over an entity
even in the absence of formal share ownership or contractual arrangements. 151
The new law puts considerably more teeth into these provisions.
Article 37 provides that banks in their "business activities" may not approve
more favorable conditions to a person related to the bank than the conditions
approved to other persons not related to that bank.' 52 Persons related to a bank
include:
(1) Members of the same banking group as the bank;
(2) Members of the board of directors and executive board
of the bank, members of management and governing
bodies of a member of the same banking group in which
the bank is, bank employees, as well as family members
of these persons;
(3) Persons with a participation in the bank and in entities
which are the members of the same banking group in
which the bank is, as well as family members (as
defined in the law which governs business companies)
of these persons;
(4) Legal entities in which persons specified in items 2 and
3 of this paragraph hold controlling participation.
53
A bank may conclude a transaction with a related person after being
granted the written approval of the bank's board of directors. 54 This approval
is not required in case of:
(1) Placing deposits of related persons;
(2) Granting credit collateralized by a linked deposit of a
related person;
(3) Granting credit collateralized by debt securities of the
Republic of Serbia or the National Bank of Serbia,
and/or debt securities of persons ranked by recognized
151 See discussion supra note 61 and accompanying texts.
152 Serbian Banking Law, supra note 1, art. 37.
153 Id. at art. 2.
14 id. at art. 38, I.
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international agencies whose rating is not lower than
"A". 155
Members of a bank's board of directors are not permitted to
participate in the consideration or approval of any legal transaction between
themselves and the bank, between themselves and any member of their family,
and between the bank and a legal entity in which they or any member of their
family participates in management or governance, or in which they have a
significant or controlling participation.' 6 A bank also may not approve credits
to its shareholders until one year following the day when the bank commenced
its business activities.157 Transactions concluded in breach of these conditions
are deemed null and void.
5 8
D. Consolidated Supervision
One of the new law's major accomplishments is the adoption of
comprehensive provisions on consolidated supervision of "banking groups."
This feature was totally absent froni the 1993 law, yet it is critical to Serbia's
hopes to join the EU. Consolidated supervision is a major part of the EU's
banking and financial supervisory framework. Its principles are reflected
mainly in two directives: the Banking Directive 159 and the Financial
Conglomerates Directive. 160  Apart from the legal requirements that EU
member states implement consolidated supervision, it is also vital from a
practical standpoint. Two of the Basel Core Principles (24 and 25) address
consolidated supervision directly. 61 But compliance with these two principles
has a ripple effect: failure to comply with Core Principles 24 and 25 throws a
country into non-compliance with many of the other Core Principles. It is
quite clear that a country cannot be considered to be in overall compliance
with the Core Principles unless it practices effective consolidated
supervision.' 
62
'5 Id. at 3.
51 Id. at 34.151 ld. at art. 39.
15 Id. at art. 40.
159 See EU Banking Directive, supra note 55, especially arts. 124-141.
160 See EU Financial Conglomerates Directive, supra note 56.
161 BASEL CORE PRINCIPLES, supra note 75, Principles 24, 25. Principle 24 deals
generally with consolidated supervision, while Principle 25 specifically addresses the
cross-border aspects of this issue.
162 See Stirewalt and Gegenheimer, supra note 61, at 546, n. 37. Other Core
Principles that are affected by the extent of a country's application of consolidated
supervision include Principle 3 (licensing); Principle 4 (transfers of significant
ownership); Principle 5 (major acquisitions by banks); Principle 6 (capital adequacy);
2007]
32 SOUTH CAROLINA JOURNAL OF [Vol. 3:1
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND BUSINESS
1. The Importance of Consolidated Supervision
All banks are subject to financial risks, which emanate from activities
that they directly undertake. Traditional banking risks include credit risk,
liquidity risk, interest rate risk, and foreign exchange risk. But special risks,
which are not as easily measured, also become applicable if the bank is part of
a "group" of companies. Specific risks that apply in the banking group context
include the following:
* Contagion - the risk that financial difficulties in another
company in the group might "infect" the bank itself.
Normally this arises because the bank's depositors
assume that financial problems of the other company
could mean that the financial stability of the bank is also
in jeopardy. This perception can precipitate substantial
rapid withdrawals of deposits, resulting in a liquidity
deficiency, and, if the problem escalates, a major "run"
on deposits, which can even spread to other banks.
* Group Transparency - the possibility that controlling
persons of a group might deliberately choose a complex
structure in order to obscure the group's true ownership,
control, or operations, and thereby avoid effective
regulation and supervision of the bank. In this scenario,
financial fraud and insider abuse are high possibilities.
* Qualit ., of Management - the risk that the owners and
managers of a non-bank parent company might establish
policies for the group that is detrimental to the bank or
banks in the group. This can come about because the
parent company's owners or management might have
business objectives other than prudent management of
the bank, or lack a good understanding of the banking
business and its regulatory requirements. In these
circumstances, group/parent management might
override or direct bank decisions, so that bank
management loses some autonomy, or cannot exercise
effective control over the bank's lending or investment
decisions. In the worst-case scenario, the managers or
controlling participants of the group might use the bank
Principle 10 (large exposures); Principle I I (exposures to related parties); Principle 21
(receipt of prudential reports on a solo and consolidated basis); Principle 22
(accounting and disclosure); and Principle 23 (corrective and remedial powers).
SERBIAN BANK REFORM
as a cheap funding source for the other group members,
with insufficient regard for the safe operation of the
bank. As with the previous point, in this scenario
insider abuse and bank failure are high possibilities.
" Access to Information - the possibility that non-bank
parent companies of banks, or non-bank subordinated
companies of those parent companies, might be
unwilling or unable to supply information to the bank
for onward transmission to the bank regulator. This can
be a particular problem in the case of foreign parents or
subsidiaries.
* Group Exposures to Third Parties - the possibility that
the bank could be adversely impacted due to excessive
loans to, or investments in, other entities by the group or
its non-bank members. Although it usually is not
feasible to apply to such wider groups the same kinds of
lending or investment limitations that apply to banks, all
such groups should have their own limitations, policies
and procedures for monitoring loans and investments.
" Moral Hazard - the risk that related companies of a
bank might take excessive risks in the belief that the
bank regulator or deposit insurer will provide them
support in order to avoid a "contagion" effect on the
related bank. 1
63
Because of the dangers that these risks can pose to a bank, financial
sector regulatory authorities must be aware of the structure of, and risks
inherent in, any group of companies that includes a bank. Specifically, the
regulator needs to be aware of the ownership structure, corporate governance
standards, internal controls and risk management systems that the group uses
to carry out its activities. The regulator also needs to review and assess the
group's controls on intra-group transactions and have continuing knowledge of
aggregated large risk exposures within the group. The regulator further needs
to assess the adequacy of capital on a consolidated basis to prevent a single
financial entity within the group from showing an adequate capital position by
virtue of accounting "gimmicks." In order to accomplish these tasks -the
regulator must have two critical legal authorities:
163 RONALD MACDONALD, CONSOLIDATED SUPERVISION OF BANKS, BANK OF
ENGLAND HANDBOOKS IN CENTRAL BANKING No. 5 10-15 (ed. Simon Gray 1998).
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(1) the authority to obtain reliable information about all of
the entities in the group; and
(2) the authority to take effective corrective actions, or
cause other financial sector supervisors to do so, when
activities or conditions of these affiliated persons may
be detrimental to the financial stability of the bank(s)
within the group. 164
In bank supervisory parlance, there are three basic kinds of groups:
(1) the bank and its downstream affiliates, sometimes called
a simple banking group, or just a banking group;165
(2) a financial conglomerate, a group of companies that
engage in a range of different financial activities that
have been traditionally kept separate (typically defined
as banking, underwriting and trading in securities., and
insurance); 166
(3) a mixed-activity group, which contains commercial and
industrial companies as well as one or more banks.
1 67
164 BASEL COMMITTEE, CORE PRINCIPLES METHODOLOGY, supra note 75, at 38,
Principle 23, Additional Criteria, points 2 and 3.
165 See MACDONALD, supra note 163, at 9-10. In some cases, the group might be
headed by a holding company, but the principal activity of the group is banking. See id.
Traditionally, the Basel Committee considered a "banking group" to be only a bank and
its banking or financial subsidiaries. See BASEL COMMITTEE, INTERNATIONAL
CONVERGENCE OF CAPITAL MEASUREMENT AND CAPITAL STANDARDS (July 1988) [Basel
I] 3, 10, and 7, 24. More recently, the Committee has included certain holding
companies in the banking group structure. See BASEL COMMITTEE, INTERNATIONAL
CONVERGENCE OF CAPITAL MEASUREMENT AND CAPITAL STANDARDS: A REVISED
FRAMEWORK (June 2004) [Basel II] 7, 21 (defining a "banking group" as a group of
companies that engages predominantly in banking activities, including the holding
company). The holding company of the banking group might itself have a parent
company, but that parent company would not be considered part of the banking group if
its activities are broader than banking. See id. at n. 4.
166 See MACDONALD, supra note 163, at 10; George A. Walker, Conglomerate
Law and International Financial Market Supervision, 17 ANN. REV. BANKING L. 287
(1998); George A. Walker, The Law of Financial Conglomerates: The Next
Generation. 30 INT'L LAW. 57.
167 See MACDONALD, supra note 163, at 9-10; See also EU Banking Directive,
supra note 55, art. 4 20 (defining "mixed-activity holding company").
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2. Consolidated Supervision and the New Serbian Banking Law
The new Serbian Banking Law represents a vast improvement over
the previous law in this area. The law specifically defines a "banking group,"
as a group of financial sector persons that includes at least one bank, and
subjects such groups to special rules. 168
Under the new law, a "group" of companies consists of the ultimate
parent company of a legal entity, its subordinated companies and associated
companies of the subsidiaries of the legal entity.169 A parent company of a
legal entity means a legal entity that holds controlling participation in such
entity. 170 The ultimate parent company of a group is the legal entity in which
no other legal entity holds a controlling participation.' 17  A subordinated
company of a legal entity means a subsidiary or an associated company of
such entity. 172 A subsidiary of a legal entity means a company in which such
entity holds controlling participation. 173 An associated company of a legal
entity means a company in which such entity holds significant participation.'
74
A banking group means a group of companies which consists exclusively of
financial sector persons, and which includes at least one bank being the
ultimate parent company or a subsidiary. 175 A bank holding company is the
ultimate parent company in a banking group other than a bank. 1
76
Banking groups are subject to special rules. 177 One of the most
important of these relates to group transparency. The structure of a banking
group must be sufficiently transparent to allow the NBS to determine:
(1) The ultimate parent company of the banking group and
persons who hold controlling or significant participation
in that company;
(2) Location and types of business activities conducted
within the banking group;
168 Serbian Banking Law, supra note 1, art. 2,
169 id.
170 id.
171 id.
172 id.
173 id.
174 Id. This definition is the equivalent of the EU's "participation" definition. See
EU Banking Directive, supra note 55, art. 4, 10.
175 Serbian Banking Law, supra note 1, art. 2.
176 Id.
17 7 Id. at ch. V, part 4.
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(3) The financial situation and business results of the
banking group and its members;
(4) Types and levels of risks that the banking group and its
members are exposed to;
(5) The manner in which risk management is organized and
implemented at the banking group level; and
(6) The business, financial and other relationships between
members of the banking group. 178
The organizational structure of a banking group must be such as to
enable adequate internal and external audits, as well as not to impede the
National Bank of Serbia's ability to perform its supervisory duties.'
79
The ultimate parent company of each banking group must prepare
and submit consolidated financial statements to the NBS.180 Both the bank and
the ultimate parent company of the group are responsible for all meeting this
requirement.'
8
'
Provisions of the law on capital adequacy, large exposures,
investments in other legal entities and fixed assets, and limitations on open net
currency position apply to banking groups on a consolidated basis.'82 The
NBS may require the bank in a banking group to hold additional capital or to
prescribe a capital adequacy ratio for the bank higher than the otherwise-
prescribed level, if it determines that the level of the capital of the banking
group jeopardizes the stable business activities of the bank. 8 3 Each banking
group is also obliged to provide procedures for risk management and
procedures for internal audit and internal control that correspond to the
group's activities, as well as regular monitoring and updating of those
procedures.' i 4 Both the bank and the ultimate parent company of a banking
178 Id. at art 123, 1. The model for this provision is the Australian Prudential
Regulatory Authority (APRA) Policy Framework for the Prudential Supervision of
Conglomerate Groups Containing Authorised Deposit-Taking Institutions (Policy
Information Paper, April 2000), available at http://www.apra.gov.au [hereinafter
APRA Conglomerate Policy].
179 Serbian Banking Law, supra note 1, art. 123, 2.
80 Id. at art. 126, 1.
..1 Id. at, 2.
112 Id. at, art. 127, i.
183 Id. at 2.
i84 Id. at 3. Cf APRA Conglomerate Policy, supra note 178, at 9, 34. See
also EU Financial Conglomerates Directive, supra note 56, art. 9 (requiring risk
management and internal controls at the conglomerate level); German Banking Act,
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group are responsible for determining and submitting the referenced data to
the NBS.
85
The law also authorizes the NBS to take corrective measures against
any member of a banking group in case of violations or practices endangering
the bank in the group.
1 86
A bank may establish or acquire a subordinated company only with
the consent of the NBS.187 Only financial sector persons may be subordinated
companies of banks. 88 . The NBS is authorized to prescribe detailed
requirements and the manner of granting for such consent.' 89 A bank holding
company may not establish or acquire direct or indirect ownership in a
subordinated company if such acquisition would have a negative impact on
business activities of the bank in which the bank holding company holds
controlling participation.'9" A bank holding company must inform the NBS of
any such ownership in a subordinated company within fifteen days after the
date of the acquisition.' 9' Should the NBS establish that such an acquisition
may have negative consequences for the bank within the banking group, it can
take any enforcement measures prescribed by the Banking Law.
192
While the new law clearly marks an improvement on the old regime,
it is only partially effective at giving the NBS the tools to perform effective
consolidated supervision. The problem is that the consolidated supervision
provisions are only applicable to "banking groups," which by definition
supra note 67, § 25a(l); Croatian Banking Law, art. 93, available at
http://www.lexadin.nlI/wlg/legis/nofr/eur/lxwecro.htm#Banking%201aw (last visited
Dec. 4, 2006); Estonian Credit Institutions Act, supra note 76, § 82(1), (2).
185 Serbian Banking Law, supra note 1, art. 127, 4.
86 Id. at art. 128. Compare 12 U.S.C. § 1818(b)(3) (2002) (stating that
enforcement measures apply to U.S. bank holding companies and their non-bank
subsidiaries in the same manner as they apply to banks) with Canadian Bank Act, supra
note 70, § 960 (authorizing the Superintendent to issue directions of compliance against
bank holding companies and their affiliates); German Banking Act, supra note 67, §
6(3) (authorizing the Federal Financial Supervisory Authority (BAFin) to issue
corrective orders to financial holding companies and their managers); EU Banking
Directive, supra note 55, arts. 21, 2, 142; EU Financial Conglomerates Directive,
supra note 56, art. 16.
187 Serbian Banking Law, supra note 1, art. 124, 1.
18 Id. at 2.
"
8 9 Id. at 3.
'
90 Id. at art. 125, 7  1.
'9' Id. at 2.112 ld. at 3.
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include only financial sector persons. 9 3 Mixed-activity groups - groups
consisting of commercial and industrial companies in addition to banks - are
permitted, since any type of legal entity is allowed to own a bank, but such
groups are not subject to any of the requirements of transparency, group-wide
risk management or internal controls that are vital to an effective consolidated
supervision regime. As a result, the law's requirements in this area are easy to
evade: all a controlling shareholder has to do is create a non-financial "shell"
holding company, and the group avoids the requirements of section 4 of
chapter V altogether. This is the case even if every other enterprise in the
group is a financial sector enterprise.
This could lead to a serious gap in the NBS's supervisory capabilities.
The risks outlined above are not diminished simply because a group has a non-
financial focus. Indeed, they are probably higher in non-financial groups.
Industrial and commercial owners and managers are probably less likely than
financial owners and managers to be familiar with the concepts of safe and
sound banking and the regulatory requirements that pertain to banks. If
anything, the NBS needs to be more - not less - concerned about banks'
involvement in mixed-activity groups than in purely financial ones.
This problem is not unique to Serbia. The EU banking-related
directives, and the banking laws of most EU countries, do not provide
comprehensive guidance for the supervision of banks in mixed-activity
groups. 194 The following section briefly outlines these issues.
3. Mixed Activity Groups and the EU Banking Directive
While the EU Banking Directive undeniably pays more attention to
financially-oriented groups than mixed-activity ones, it does contain some
provisions concerning the latter groups. It specifically defines a "mixed-
activity holding company"' 95 and clearly states that the competent authorities
of the EU member states must have certain tools with regard to such
companies and their groups, not just financially-oriented groups. For example:
193 Id. In this sense the Serbian Banking Law is actually even more restrictive
than the EU approach. See discussion infra.
194 For a more detailed examination of these issues, See Gary A. Gegenheimer,
Bank Supervisors and Mixed Activity Groups: A Comparison of the European and
Australian Approaches and Lessons for Transition Economies, (forthcoming), 22
BANKING & FIN. L.R. 239 (2007).
195 EU Banking Directive, supra note 55, at art. 4(20) (defining a "mixed activity
holding company" as a parent undertaking, other than a financial holding company or a
credit institution or a mixed financial holding company within the meaning of the
Financial Conglomerates Directive, the subsidiaries of which include at least one credit
institution).
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* In the case of groups with diversified activities the
parent undertakings of which control at least one credit
institution subsidiary, the competent authorities must be
able to assess the financial situation of a credit
institution in such a group....The competent authorities
must at least have the means of obtaining from all
undertakings within a group the information necessary
for the performance of their function. 1
96
* Member States should be able to refuse or withdraw
banking licenses in the case of certain group structures
considered inappropriate for carrying on banking
activities, in particular because such structures cannot
be supervised effectively. In this respect, the
supervisory authorities should have the necessary
powers to ensure the sound and prudent management of
banks.' 97  The Directive does not specify what an
inappropriate group structure might be, or how
supervisory authorities should undertake to ensure the
sound and prudent management of banks that may be
parts of such groups. Clearly, however, this entails, at
the very least, reviewing the activities of banks' parent
companies and the other group companies in order to
assess the safety and soundness of the bank; establishing
and enforcing "fit and proper" standards for owners and
managers of parent companies; and taking appropriate
remedial actions with regard to those parent or other
group companies concerning matters that could
adversely impact the bank.198
* Competent authorities may refuse or withdraw banking
licenses if they determine that "close links" between a
196 Id. at "whereas" clause 59 (emphasis added).
197 Id. at "whereas" clause 60.
198 See BASEL COMMITTEE, CORE PRINCIPLES METHODOLOGY, supra note 75, at 38
(Principle 23, additional criteria, points 2 and 3); 40 (Principle 24, additional criteria,
point 1). See also BASEL COMMITTEE, ENHANCING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN
BANKING ORGANIZATIONS (updated February 2006) (bank supervisors must be able to
obtain information regarding the structure of the group to which a bank belongs, a full
list of all group entities affiliated with the bank, the business lines of the group, the
adequacy of the oversight process within the group, and all material risks and other
issues that may affect the group); MACDONALD supra note 163, at 30 (noting that group
annual reports and periodic meetings with group management can be very effective
tools for assessing the risks to banks in mixed-activity groups).
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bank and other natural or legal persons prevent proper
supervision of the bank.' 99 Such a determination cannot
be made without a qualitative assessment of the overall
group structure, including an evaluation of the
suitability of the group's risk management, internal
controls, corporate governance practices and financial
situation.
" Competent authorities are obliged to put an end to any
situation in which it determines that persons with
"qualifying holdings" in a bank (generally the same
concept as a "participation" under the Serbian Law on
Banks) are acting in a manner that is detrimental to the
sound and prudent management of the bank.200 This
determination cannot be made unless the competent
authority has the ability to obtain timely and reliable
information from and about persons with qualifying
holdings. Moreover, the supervisory authority must be
able to make a qualitative assessment of the business
activities of such persons and their actual or potential
impact on the bank, in order to determine whether such
remedial action is necessary.
* Competent authorities must have the power to impose
sanctions not only against credit institutions (banks), but
also against persons who "effectively control the
business" of such institutions (which, again, would
necessarily include mixed-activity holding companies
and their owners and managers), in cases of violations
of pertinent laws, regulations or administrative
provisions.2° 1
* Member States are directed to exercise "general
supervision" over transactions between banks and their
parent mixed-activity holding companies and
subsidiaries of those companies; to require banks to
have adequate risk management processes, internal
controls and reporting provisions in place with respect
to such transactions; and to take "appropriate measures"
199 EU Banking Directive, supra note 55, at arts. 12(3), 17(l)(c).
21 Id. at art. 21(2).
211 Id. at art. 54.
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where any such transactions would constitute a threat to
the bank's financial position.:-
4. A Suggested Methodology for Dealing with Mixed Activity Groups
Fortunately, the new Banking Law gives the NBS the authority to
accomplish, via implementing by-laws, many of the same kinds of things with
regard to mixed-activity groups that it can accomplish with regard to banking
groups and to achieve compliance with the EU Banking Directive. The NBS
should utilize this authority vigorously.
For international guidance in this process, the NBS should consult the
analogous provisions adopted by the Australian Prudential Regulatory
Authority (APRA). APRA has promulgated supervisory guidelines relating to
"conglomerate groups," meaning any group of companies containing one or
more "authorized depository institutions" (i.e., banks, or "ADIs"). 20 3 Many of
the consolidated supervision provisions of the Serbian Banking Law were
patterned largely on the APRA model; the critical distinction is that in the
Serbian case, applicability is limited to groups containing exclusively.
financially-oriented enterprises, whereas in Australia a conglomerate group
may include non-financial as well as financial entities, regulated or
unregulated. 204 The requirements of group transparency, 20 5 group-wide risk
management policies,20 6 and fit and proper management20 7 apply to all
conglomerate groups, regardless of whether the group is purely financial or a
wider mixed activity group. With regard to capital adequacy, APRA
recognizes that it is not practical to apply bank capital rules to mixed activity
groups. It therefore takes a flexible approach and tailors the capital
requirements for each group to its particular characteristics.
20 8
202 Id. at art. 138.
203 APRA Conglomerate Policy, supra note 178, at 4, 1. In Australia, a "group"
of companies includes a parent company and its subsidiaries, but does not include the
EU concept of "participations."204 id. at 4, 2.
205 Id. at 5, 8.
206 Id. at 30.
207 Id. at 7, 21-22.
208 Id. at 11, 44. Most Australian banks do not have significant corporate
affiliations with non-financial enterprises, and for those banks, the Level I and Level 2
requirements are adequate. See APRA, Capital Adequacy and Exposure Limits for
Conglomerate Groups Including ADIs (Discussion Paper October 2001) 3 [hereinafter
Conglomerate Capital and Exposure Policy]. A handful of conglomerate groups,
however, have characteristics that make the application of the Basel rules impractical.
For these groups, APRA applies a more flexible approach. Only conglomerate groups
designated by APRA must meet these requirements. Id. Each such "prescribed
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Article 94 of the Serbian Banking Law gives the NBS broad authority
to require virtually any data that the NBS deems appropriate in making a
decision as to whether to approve a request to acquire ownership in a bank at
or above certain benchmarks.2 °9  Pursuant to this authority, the NBS
undoubtedly could require any person to submit data about other persons with
which the applicant has "close links" as defined in the Banking Directive. 210 If
the bank would be part of a group as a result of the acquisition, the NBS could
use this authority to inquire about the structure of the group, the quality of its
management, its business activities, corporate governance practices, risk
management and so forth.
Once approval is given for a banking license under Article 16 or for
an acquisition under Article 94, bank participants are obliged to furnish the
NBS with updated data periodically, at times determined by the NBS and at
least once per year. The message and intent of Article 101 are clear: the
NBS must have continuing knowledge of the group's structure, quality of
management, risk-management, internal controls and corporate governance
practices.
In general, the kind of "core" data that the NBS should require from
mixed-activity groups should not differ radically from the information that it
requires from pure banking groups. The principal difference is that certain
numerically-based prudential requirements, such as capital adequacy
requirements and large exposure limitations, would not be applicable to mixed
activity holding companies or the non-bank members of such groups. The
NBS should, however, be satisfied as to the content of the holding company's
conglomerate" has to have an APRA-approved group structure and must adopt an
APRA-approved, group-wide capital calculation from a menu of options which takes
into account all of the group's members, whether banks, insurers or unregulated
entities, and the capacity of any surplus capital to be moved around the group according
to need. APRA Conglomerate Capital and Exposure Policy, supra at 5-6. The menu of
options is based on the methodologies put forward by the Joint Forum on Financial
Conglomerates, although banks can propose their own internal capital estimation and
allocation models. Id. The bank must satisfy APRA that the conglomerate group of
which it was a part has sufficient capital (defined according to the standard Basel
Committee Tier I and Tier 2 definitions) for the risk profile of the group as a whole. Id.
Where APRA is not satisfied with the group-wide assessment, it may impose
additional capital requirements upon the bank. Id. at 6.
209 Serbian Banking Law, supra note 1, art. 94, 3.
210 See EU Banking Directive, supra note 55, art. 4. 46 (defining "close links"
as a situation in which two or more natural or legal persons are linked by a
"participation" or "control" relationship; a situation in which two or more natural or
legal persons are permanently linked to one and the same person by a control
relationship is also regarded as constituting a close link between those persons).211 Serbian Banking Law, supra note 1, art. 101.
SERBIAN BANK REFORM
and group's risk management policies, so that the bank will not be exposed to
undue risk. The NBS should also be satisfied as to the group's transparency.
It should be easy for the NBS to determine who the real controlling
participants of the bank are, and the mutual relationships between the bank and
the other members of the group. Finally, the NBS should be satisfied as to the
business reputation and professional qualifications of all members of
management bodies of legal entities with participations in banks.
21 2
With so many Serbian banks being subsidiaries of foreign entities, the
NBS should make it a condition of approval for owning a Serbian bank that
the parent company provide the NBS with all of the information'that it needs
to properly supervise the bank. A foreign parent that does not agree to provide
this information should not have its application approved, and a parent that
does not provide the information after having agreed to do so should have its
approval revoked.213
It remains to be seen whether, and how, the NBS will actually utilize
this considerable authority.
E. External Audits
Currently, the auditing and accounting profession in Serbia is
considered poor and capacity is limited.214 The new Banking Law seeks to
remedy this situation, to the extent possible, by requiring all banks to undergo
an annual external audit and generally adopting a number of EU-friendly
provisions.
Under the previous law, the legal requirements relating to external
audits of banks were quite sparse. Moreover, the requirements were scattered
between the Banking Law and Law on the National Bank.
Articles 36 through 38 of the previous Banking Law required that
each bank have its annual statement of accounts audited within six months of
the close of the calendar year, that the report had to be presented to the bank's
212 See Gegenheimer, Bank Supervisors and Mixed Activity Groups, supra note
194 at 284-88.
213 A comparable provision is found in the APRA Conglomerate Policy, supra
note 178 at 4, 4 (stating that a foreign conglomerate group containing an Australian
bank must satisfy APRA that it is subject to regulatory oversight broadly consistent
with that applied by APRA with regard to Australian conglomerate groups).
214 Intemational Monetary Fund, Serbia and Montenegro: Serbia-Financial
System Stabilirv Assessment, including Reports on the Observance of Standards and
Codes on the following topics: Monetar and Financial Policy Transparency, Banking
Supervision, and Payment Systems, Country Report 06/96, Mar. 2006, at 19.
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supervisory board, and that the bank's financial statements had to be published
every year.2 15 Article 77 of the Law on the National Bank required banks to
furnish the NBS and Minister of Finance with their auditors' reports by July
15th of each year.216 Article 61 of the NBS Law provided that the NBS would
prescribe the minimum scope of auditing and audit reports for banks, and
could require banks to furnish it with audit reports.217
These provisions were desirable, but more were necessary. In
particular, the law did not address the relationship between the external
auditors and the NBS. This relationship, however, is critical to the supervisory
function.218
The new Banking Law seeks to remedy this situation by upgrading
the external audit requirements considerably. The new requirements are a
blend of EU provisions and internal banking legislation of EU and Basel
Committee countries.
Each bank, banking group, and bank holding company must annually
hire an external auditor and notify the NBS within fifteen days from the day of
such appointment. 2'9 The NBS determines and publishes a list of external
auditors that can perform auditing of banks on the basis of criteria it
prescribes.
220
A bank may not appoint an external auditor whose income from
auditing that bank in the previous year exceeds one-half of the external
auditor's total income. 22' The external auditor may conduct not more than
three consecutive annual financial statements audits of the bank.2 2  The
external auditor may not conduct both an audit of the bank's financial
statements and provide consulting services to such bank during the same year,
nor may they conduct an audit for the business year in which they provided
consulting services to such bank.223 Should an audit be performed by the
external auditor who is not included in the list specified in Article 52, and/or if
215 1993 Banking Law, supra note 4, arts. 36-38.
216 Law on the National Bank, supra note 39, art. 77.
27 Id. at art. 61
218 See BASEL COMMITTEE, CORE PRINCIPLES METHODOLOGY, supra note 75, at
36-37; Basel Committee, THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN BANK SUPERVISORS AND BANKS'
EXTERNAL AUDITORS (January 2002).
219 Serbian Banking Law, supra note 1, art. 52.
220 id.
22 Id. at art. 53.
222 id.
223 id.
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the audit has been conducted in breach of provisions of this Law and other
regulations, the NBS cannot accept the auditor's report.224
The audit manager must have the highest professional degree in the
field of auditing, in compliance with the law that governs auditing, three years
of experience in conducting audits of banks, and must be independent of the
bank. Independence means that the person is not, and during the two previous
business years, has not been:
(1) ...a person related to the bank or any member of the
banking group;
(2) ...a business partner of the bank or any member of the
banking group;
(3) ... a person with direct or indirect ownership in the bank
or any member of the banking group;
(4) ... a liquidation administrator or a receiver of a member
of the banking group;
(5) ... a contractual party in a contractual relationship with a
person who might have a negative impact on his
impartiality and independence. 25
Annual audits of banking groups' financial reports must be performed
on a consolidated basis.226 Each subordinated company of a bank or a bank
holding company must also provide external audits of its individual annual
financial statements.227 Such audits must be performed by the external auditor
appointed by the ultimate parent company of a banking group.228 With the
consent of the NBS, a non-banking subordinated company need not be
included in the audit specified if:
224 id.
225 Id. at art. 54.
226 Compare id.at art. 55 with Croatian Banking Law, supra note 184, art. 112(1)
(requiring annual external audit for the entire banking group); Estonian Credit
Institutions Act, supra note 76, § 93(3) (requiring that companies belonging to the same
"consolidation group" as a credit institution must be audited by at least one common
auditor); Canadian Bank Act, supra note 70, § 860 (a bank holding company must take
all necessary steps to ensure that each of its subsidiaries has the same auditor as the
bank holding company); and APRA Conglomerate Policy, supra note 178, §§ 61-63
(referring to a group external auditor).
227 Serbian Banking Law, supra note 1, art. 55.
228 id.
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(1) its capital according to the balance sheet is less than 5%
of total capital of the bank, according to the balance
sheet of the bank, and/or bank holding company;
(2) the subordinated company has realized less than 5% of
the income of the bank, and/or bank holding company
during the previous business year.
Additionally, with the consent or upon the request of the NBS, the
non-banking subordinated company need not be included in the audit of the
banking group if, in the opinion of the NBS, such non-inclusion would
contribute to the objective perception of the financial situation of the group. -2 29
The external auditor must prepare a report and provide an opinion as
to whether the annual financial statement of the bank has been composed in
compliance with International Financial Reporting Standards or International
Accounting Standards, law which governs accounting and audit and
regulations of the NBS, and whether it provides true and objective overview of
the bank's financial position, business results and cash flows for the business
year regarding all issues of material importance. 230 The external auditor must
also provide his opinion regarding the efficiency of the functioning of the
internal audit, systems of risk management and internal control to the bank's
board of directors and executive board, as well as to the NBS.
231
Serbia has joined a growing number of countries that require external
auditors to report irregularities that they uncover in the course of their audits.
The external auditor must notify the board of directors and executive board of
a bank, and/or a member of the banking group, as well as the NBS promptly
after becoming aware of any fact that represents:
(1) Violation of the law or by-laws of the National Bank of
Serbia;
(2) Materially important change in the financial result
carried in annual financial statements which have not
been audited;
(3) Violation of internal procedures or enactments of the
bank or the group to which the bank belongs;
229 Compare id. with EU Banking Directive, supra note 55, art. 73.
230 Serbian Banking Law, supra note 1, art. 56.
231 id.
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(4) Any circumstances that could result in a material loss
for the bank or a member of the banking group or that
could jeopardize their continuous business operations.232
Such notification is not considered a violation of secrecy of the
bank's data or confidential information, and the external auditor shall not bear
responsibility because of it.
233
When the irregularities in the activities of the bank are established in
the external auditor's report, the bank must eliminate those irregularities and
inform the NBS of its progress, and failure to do so may lead to stronger
234enforcement measures.
A bank and bank holding company must notify the NBS in writing
regarding resignation or removal of the external auditor of a bank, bank
holding company or banking group, including a statement of the reasons for
the resignation and/or removal fifteen days following the day of the
resignation and/or removal.235 When this occurs, no other external auditor
may accept an appointment as auditor of the bank, bank holding company or
banking group, unless they obtain the written statement of the previous
auditor.236 An exception is allowed if the new auditor has not received such a
statement within fifteen days following its request, provided the new auditor
notifies the NBS of this fact. 237 The NBS is not permitted to accept the report
of an auditor who was appointed for the function unless they have requested
the statement, or if they have accepted the appointment before the specified
deadline has expired.238
232 Compare id. at art. 58 with EU Banking Directive, supra note 55, art. 53(1);
Croatian Banking Law, supra note 184, art. 113(2), (3); German Banking Act, supra
note 67, § 29(3); Swiss Banking Act, supra note 67, art. 21(3), (4); Estonian Credit
Institutions Act, supra note 76, §95(1); Latvian Credit Institution Law, art. 88(2),
available at
http://unpan l .un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/UNTC/UNPANOI 8386.pdf,(las
t visited Dec. 12, 2007); Canadian Bank Act, supra note 70, § 328(2)(d).
233 Serbian Banking Law, supra note 1, art. 56.
234 Id. at art. 59
235 Id. at art. 60. This provision and the immediately following ones are modeled
on the Canadian Bank Act, supra note 70, art. 321, 322 (banks) and arts. 853, 854
(bank holding companies). See also U.S. Federal Deposit Insurance Act, section
36(g)(5), 12 U.S.C. § 183 1m(g)(5).
236 Id. This appears to be a drafting error: paragraph I refers to a written
statement that must be furnished by the bank or bank holding company to the NBS;
paragraph 2, by contrast, is about a statement that must be composed by the auditor.
237 id.238 Serbian Banking Law, supra note 1, art. 56.
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A bank must submit to the NBS individual financial statements of the
bank and its bank holding company together with the external auditor's report
for the preceding business year -within 120 days after the end of such year.239
The NBS may also require any member of the banking group to submit
individual financial statements together with the external auditor's report. 240 A
bank must submit consolidated financial statements of the banking group
together with the auditor's report for the previous business year within 150
days after the end of such year.
241
Banks and bank holding companies must publish their external audit
reports in an abbreviated form in at least one of the daily newspapers
distributed in the whole territory of the Republic of Serbia within fifteen days
after receiving such report.242 Each bank must also publish on its website a
complete report of the external auditor on annual financial statements
regarding the bank, bank holding company and banking group, including notes
to the financial statements. 3 In addition to publishing the audited annual
financial statement, a bank must publish quarterly unaudited financial
statements within thirty days following expiration of the appropriate
accounting period.24 If an error has been noticed in the published reports and
data, the bank or the external auditor must promptly inform the NBS of the
error, and the bank must publish a corrected report.
245
Should the NBS determine the audit of the bank, bank holding
company or banking group has not been performed in compliance with
provisions of the Law, the NBS must not accept such audit report and must
require that another external auditor perform the audit again at the bank's
expense.246
The NBS may require a special audit of a bank or a banking group
member, by a special auditor appointed by the NBS, if the reports of the bank
or members of the banking group are inaccurate, or the concluded transactions
239 Id. at art. 61.
240 id.
24! Id.
242 id.
243 Serbian Banking Law, supra note 1, art. 61.
,244 id.
245 Id. Cf. Estonian Credit Institutions Act, supra note 76 § 92(3).
246 Compare Serbian Banking Law, supra note 1, art. 62 with Croatian Banking
Act, supra note 184, art. 114(4), (5).
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may have or have resulted in significant damage to the bank.247 The bank
bears the costs of such special audits.248
F. Prompt Corrective Action and Enforcement Measures
The new Serbian law adopts a problem bank regime based largely on
the American "prompt corrective action" concept.
A bank is considered "undercapitalized" if its "capital adequacy ratio
is below the one prescribed by the NBS, and/or if its capital is lower than the
prescribed amount, but which is not a significantly undercapitalized bank."
249
The term "significantly undercapitalized" applies to a bank "whose capital
adequacy ratio is, by one-third or more, lower than the prescribed one, and/or
whose capital is, by one-third or more, lower than the prescribed amount, but
which is not a critically undercapitalized bank.,
250
If a bank becomes undercapitalized, it must promptly inform the
NBS, and must submit information containing the reasons why the bank is
undercapitalized. 25 1 An undercapitalized bank may not:
(1) Engage in any new lines of business without the consent
of the National Bank of Serbia;
(2) Increase its risk-weighted assets without the consent of
the National Bank of Serbia;
(3) Pay dividends or perform distributions of capital in any
form;
(4) Pay higher than defined fees to members of the bank's
board of directors and executive board.252
A significantly undercapitalized bank is bound by the aforementioned
restrictions, and in addition, may not:
(1) Accept new deposits;
247 Compare Serbian Banking Law, supra note 1, art. 63 with Canadian Bank
Act, supra note 70, § 325(2)-(4); and Estonian Credit Institutions Act, supra note 76,§
102.
248 Serbian Banking Law, supra note 1, art. 63.
249 Compare id. at art. 2 with 12 U.S.C. § 1831o(b)(1)(C).
250 Compare Serbian Banking Law, supra note 2, art. 2 with 12 U.S.C. §
1831 o(b)(1)(D).
251 Serbian Banking Law, supra note 1, art. 110, .
252 Id. at 2.
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(2) Pay interest rates on deposits in excess of average
market ones;
(3) Increase salaries or other form of compensation for
work, or pay any bonuses to members of the bank's
board of directors and executive board;
(4) Conclude legal transactions with related persons without
the consent of the National Bank of Serbia, and/or
undertake transactions on behalf of related persons or
persons related to related persons.253
If a bank becomes "critically undercapitalized" - meaning that its
capital adequacy ratio is, by one-half or more, lower than the prescribed one,
and/or whose capital is, by one-half or more, lower than the prescribed
amount 254 - the law requires that the NBS revoke its license.255 There are also
provisions for corrective orders and management removals for more routine
violations and circumstances that may endanger the bank.256
G. Problem Bank Resolution
Serbia has generally received high marks from the international
development community for its efforts in dealing with defunct banks. 257 The
legal mechanisms that have helped to accomplish this were largely put in place
during the 2001-05 period. The 2005 Law on Bankruptcy and Liquidation of
Banks and Insurance Companies258 replaced the former Law on Rehabilitation,
Bankruptcy and Liquidation of Banks and related provisions of the Law on
Insurance. 2 59 The new law provides a skeletal framework for resolving the
affairs of failed banks, though many, if not most, of the substantive provisions
are located in the general Bankruptcy Law.
253 Id. at art. 111, 2.
254 Compare Serbian Banking Law, supra note 1, art. 2, with 12 U.S.C. §
183 1o(b)(l)(E).
255 Compare Serbian Banking Law, supra note I, art. 130, 1(1), with 12 U.S.C.
§ 1831 o(h)(3).256 Serbian Banking Law, supra note 1, arts. 112, 114-116.
257 See World Bank Report No. 29258-YU: Serbia and Montenegro - Republic
of Serbia, An Agenda for Economic Growth and Employment (2004), at 80, n. 105;
International Monetary Fund, Joint Staff Assessment of the Poverty Reduction Strategy
Paper Country Report No. 04/117 (2004), at I.
258 Bank Bankruptcy Law, supra note 2.259 See id. at art. 3 1.
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In overhauling its bank resolution procedures, Serbia has joined a
number of European countries that are moving away from a strictly court-
centered regime of bank resolution and toward an administrative process,
under which most of the work is done by a specialized body, such as the bank
supervisor or deposit insurer, that is intimately familiar with the special
problems involved in resolving the affairs of failed banks. 260 In Serbia, the
Deposit Insurance Agency has been given this task.2 6 1 There are three possible
ways of winding up the affairs of a bank that has become insolvent or that the
NBS determines should exit the system: bankruptcy, liquidation, or merger
with a healthy bank. Conceptually, this is a generally acceptable structure and
framework, but "the devil is in the details." Serbia has not completely
abandoned the court-centered approach. Moreover, there is a definite lack of
clarity on some critical issues, and some additional options would be desirable.
As an initial matter, the use of the words "bankruptcy" or
"insolvency" to refer to the process of winding up the affairs of a defunct bank
can be a source of confusion. While many banking laws (especially in
transition economies) and much bank supervisory literature do use these words
to describe the bank resolution process, 262 this author has always been
260 In Europe, problem bank resolution traditionally has been a judicial function,
conducted under the general insolvency law and administered by the ordinary courts
that conduct bankruptcy matters. The rationale for this approach is that bank
supervisors should deal only with "living" banks, while "fatally ill" or "dead" banks
should be turned over to the "mortician," the bankruptcy court. The theory is that since
such an entity can no longer conduct the business of banking, it is "no longer a bank"
and thus should be treated just like any other bankrupt enterprise. This is gradually
changing as more countries recognize that ordinary courts do not have the specialized
expertise that bank supervisors and deposit insurers have in dealing with these issues.
A good example can be seen in Switzerland, which adopted extensive amendments to
its Banking Act in 2003 to give the Federal Banking Commission broad powers to
reorganize or liquidate banks whose licenses it has revoked, or which encounter serious
financial problems. Swiss Banking Act, supra note 67, Sections XI (Measures in Case
of the Risk of Insolvency), XII (Liquidation of Insolvent Banks (Bank Bankruptcy).
For a more complete discussion of this topic, see Eva H.G. Hiipkes, Learning Lessons
and Implementing a New Approach: Bank Insolvency Resolution in Switzerland, in
WHO PAYS FOR BANK INSOLVENCY? (David G. Mayes & Aarno Liuksila eds., 2004)
[hereinafter Bank Insolvency Resolution in Switzerland]: Eva H.G. Hiipkes, Insolvency:
Why a Special Regime for Banks? in CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN MONETARY AND
FINANCIAL LAW Vol. 3 (IMF. 2003) [hereinafter Why a Special Regime].
261 Bank Bankruptcy Law, supra note 2. art. 7, 2; art. 22 (assigning to the
Agency the task of the bankruptcy administrator and liquidation administrator,
respectively, for failed banks and insurance companies).
262 See, e.g., Hidpkes, Why a Special Regime?, supra note 260; Robert R. Bliss
and George G. Kaufman, U.S. Corporate and Bank Insolvency Regimes: An Economic
Comparison and Evaluation, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago Working Paper 2006-
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uncomfortable with this terminology. Ultimately, the real issue is not
"bankruptcy" or "insolvency;" rather, it is about how to deal with the situation
of a bank that, in the judgment of the bank supervisory authority, should no
longer be allowed to continue to operate in its current form. While most banks
in this category may in fact turn out to be insolvent, this is not invariably the
case. The reasons for the supervisor's determination can be considerably
broader than insolvency or bankruptcy, and can include gross violations of
legal requirements, untrustworthy management, lack of transparency of
ownership, and others.263 Provisions must be made for resolving the affairs of
these banks, as well as those banks that can be considered insolvent or
bankrupt under traditional bankruptcy or company law concepts. Otherwise,
the bank supervisor will be saddled with a non-operating "former" bank that
cannot be liquidated or wound up, obviously not a good scenario.
The following sections explore these issues further.
01 1 n. I (2006), available at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfn?abstractid=878355; Federal Law No. 40-Fz of
February 25, 1999 On Insolvency (Bankruptcy) of Credit Institutions (as amended Aug.
20, 2004) (Rus.); Law No. 14 of February 15, 2004 of the Kyrgyz Republic on
Conservation, Liquidation and Bankruptcy of Banks (as amended by Law No. 47, Mar.
10, 2005) (Kg); Swiss Banking Act, supra note 67.
263 See, e.g., Swiss Banking Act, supra note 67, art. 23(5) (authorizing license
revocation and forcible liquidation for "gross violations of legal requirements"); U.S.
Federal Deposit Insurance Act, section 11, 12 U.S.C § 1821 (authorizing appointment
of a conservator or receiver for a bank on the basis of, among other things, an "unsafe
or unsound condition to transact business," "violations of law, regulation, or an unsafe
or unsound practice that is likely to seriously prejudice the interests of the depositors or
the deposit insurance fund"); German Banking Act, supra note 67, §§ 35 and 38
(authorizing license revocation and resultant liquidation if grounds exist that would
warrant refusal of the license, or if the safety of assets entrusted to a bank is
"endangered"); Canadian Bank Act, supra note 70, §§ 648 - 651 (authorizing the
Superintendent of Financial Institutions to take control of a bank if, among other
grounds, he determines that "a practice or state of affairs that may be materially
prejudicial to the interests of the bank's depositors or creditors or the owners of any
assets under the bank's administration." The Superintendent may petition the court for
a winding-up order with respect to any bank that is under his control); Estonian Credit
Institutions Act, supra note 76, § 17(11)(authorizing license revocation if a bank's
"activities cause significant damage" to the interests of depositors,); French Monetary
and Financial Code, art. L613-21, L613-22 (a bank may be deleted from the list of
authorized institutions as a disciplinary sanction; such striking off entails liquidation of
the bank. Such sanctions may be imposed if the bank has contravened a law or
regulation relating to its business, has not responded to a recommendation, has not
heeded a cautionary notice, or has not complied with an injunction issued by the
Banking Commission). See generally TOBIAS M.C. ASSER, LEGAL ASPECTS OF
REGULATORY TREATMENT OF BANKS IN DISTRESS 124-26, 149-51 (International
Monetary Fund, 2001); Bliss and Kaufman, supra note 262.
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1. What Law Applies?
The question of exactly what law applies to the case of winding up
the affairs of a defunct bank is not entirely clear. The Bankruptcy Law clearly
states that it does not apply to bankruptcy proceedings involving banks or
insurance companies, except for areas that are not covered by special
legislation involving those entities.26 On the other hand, the Bank Bankruptcy
Law provides that with a few specified exceptions, bankruptcy and liquidation
matters involving banks and insurance companies are governed by the general
bankruptcy law, unless the Bank Bankruptcy Law provides otherwise.265
Because the content of the Bank Bankruptcy Law is so sparse, as a practical
matter it is inevitable that the Bankruptcy Law will need to be consulted in a
number of situations involving banks.
2. "Bankruptcy" or "Liquidation:" A Distinction Without a Difference?
According to the Serbian Banking Law, the NBS is required to
revoke a bank's license if the bank:
(1) is critically undercapitalized;
(2) fail[s] to enable the National Bank of Serbia to perform
supervision of safety and soundness and legal
compliance of its activities;
(3) continuously ceased to engage in activities of receiving
deposits or granting credits during six months, except if
it has been ordered to do so by the corrective measure
declared by the National Bank of Serbia.266
The National Bank of Serbia may [also] revoke [a] bank's
license if:
(1) the bank has critically strained liquidity;
(2) [the NBS] determines that the bank's operating license
was issued on the basis of false data;
(3) the bank's founder withdraws the funds invested in the
initial capital of the bank;
264 Bankruptcy Law, RS Official Gazette No.84/04 (2005), art. 6, 2.
265 Bank Bankruptcy Law, supra note 2, arts. 19, 21.
266 Serbian Banking Law, supra note 1, art. 130, 1.
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(4) the bank fails to commence its operations within 60
days following entry into the register of economic
entities;
(5) [the NBS] determines that conditions specified in
Article 16., paragraph 1, items 5 and 6 and Article 19,
paragraph 1 of [the Banking] Law are no longer met;
(6) the bank is significantly undercapitalized;
(7) the undercapitalized bank fails to meet any of the
business indicators prescribed by [the Banking] Law or
bylaws of the National Bank of Serbia;
(8) [the NBS] establishes that the bank has committed gross
or persistent violations of the law or other regulation;
(9) within the prescribed time period, the bank fails to act in
compliance with the orders specified in Article 116 of
[the Banking] Law;
(10) the bank fails to pay [the] deposit insurance premium in
compliance with the law which governs deposit
insurance; [or]
(I 1)the activities of the bank are related to money
laundering, financing of terrorism, or performing other
punishable acts.267
Revocation of a bank's license, however, is only the first step in the
resolution process. Once the NBS revokes a bank's license, it must make a
determination: whether to proceed under a "bankruptcy" scenario or under a
"liquidation" scenario.268 It is also possible for a bank that has been placed in
bankruptcy or liquidation to be taken over by a healthy bank.
269
The grounds for initiating bankruptcy proceedings with respect to a
bank are set forth in Article 2 of the Bank Bankruptcy Law, which provides
that bankruptcy proceedings may be initiated with respect to a bank whose
operating license has been revoked and which has been illiquid for fifteen days
continually, or whose liabilities exceed its assets. 270 Bankruptcy proceedings
267 Id. at art. 130, 2.2681 Id. at art. 130, 3.
269 See id. at art. 134.
270 Bank Bankruptcy Law, supra note 2, art. 2 (emphasis added).
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may also be undertaken upon the request of a liquidation administrator,
determining that the debtor entity's assets are not sufficient to settle all
creditors' claims.27'
This material is inconsistent with Article 130 of the Banking Law,
which provides that bankruptcy proceedings with regard to a bank are
undertaken only when the bank's obligations exceed its property, 272 rendering
the "illiquid for fifteen days" test of the Bank Bankruptcy Law rather
pointless. So, if a bank's license has been revoked, and it has been illiquid for
fifteen days, but it still has a minimally positive net worth, it would be possible
to initiate bankruptcy proceeding under the Bank Bankruptcy Law but not
under the Banking Law.
If a bank does not meet the criteria for "bankruptcy," the alternative
course for winding up its affairs is liquidation (assuming a voluntary acquirer
or merger partner does not materialize).2 73 In either case, the winding up
process is governed by the Bankruptcy Law, subject to any specific provisions
regarding banks that may be found in the Bank Bankruptcy Law.274 The
Bankruptcy Law, however, does not clearly distinguish between "bankruptcy"
on the one hand, and "forced liquidation" on the other, as the Bank
Bankruptcy and Banking Laws would suggest.
According to the Bankruptcy Law, there are two types of bankruptcy
proceedings: liquidation and reorganization, 75 and the latter scenario does not
apply to banks. 276  Thus, liquidation is merely one type of bankruptcy
proceeding. 27 7 Viewed another way, once a bank's license is revoked, the only
way to wind up its affairs are through liquidation or merger with a healthy
bank. If the criteria for bankruptcy are met, then the proper course of action is
271 Id. In the case of a bank, the "liquidation administrator" is the Deposit
Insurance Agency.
272 Serbian Banking Law, supra note 1, art.130, 4.
273 See Bank Bankruptcy Law, supra note 2, art. 3, 2.
274 Id. at art. 19 (providing that except as otherwise prescribed by the Bank
Bankruptcy Law, provisions of the law governing the bankruptcy of economic entities,
except for provisions on previous bankruptcy proceedings, bankruptcy judge, the board
of creditors and re-organization, apply to bankruptcy proceedings of banks and
insurance companies); id. at art. 21 (providing that the provisions of the general
bankruptcy law apply to liquidation of banks and insurance companies, except for the
provisions relating to the board of creditors, individual creditors, refutation of legal
actions, deposit insurance and pay-out lines).
275 Bankruptcy Law, supra note 264, art. 1.
276 Bank Bankruptcy Law, supra note 2, art. 19.
277 See Bankruptcy Law, supra note 264, Ch. IX ("Conversion into Cash and
Distribution of the Bankruptcy Estate, Settlement and Conclusion of Bankruptcy
Proceedings").
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"bankruptcy;" there are two methods of proceeding in bankruptcy -
reorganization and liquidation - and since reorganization does not apply to the
case of a defunct bank, liquidation is the "default" position. If, on the other
hand, the bankruptcy criteria are not met, then the proper course of action is
liquidation. Thus, where there is no voluntary acquirer or merger partner,
liquidation is undertaken in any event.
3. Who Can Initiate Proceedings?
Another question is whether the NBS is exclusively authorized to
initiate bankruptcy proceedings with regard to a bank. Neither the Banking
Law, nor the Bank Bankruptcy Law affirmatively addresses this issue. While
the Bank Bankruptcy Law refers to the NBS's decision on bankruptcy being
forwarded to the competent court,278 it is an open question as to whether other
parties could also initiate the process under the Bankruptcy Law, given the
uncertainty as to that law's applicability to situations involving banks.
279
Under the Bankruptcy Law, a number of parties can submit a petition to
initiate bankruptcy proceedings:
* a creditor;
* the bankruptcy debtor;
* the Public Attorney's office in charge, in the name of
legal entities it represents according to law, and which
are creditors;
* the Public Prosecutor in charge, if the bankruptcy debtor
is insolvent and there is probable cause that the
insolvency is linked to committing a crime that has to be
prosecuted ex officio; or
* the Tax Administration.
280
Assuming that any of these parties could submit a petition with regard
to a bank, the question then becomes, what must that party show in order to
initiate the proceeding?
Under the Bankruptcy Law, a creditor may initiate a bankruptcy
proceeding if he can prove that the existence of his claim is probable and that
278 Bank Bankruptcy Law, supra note 2, art. 6.
279 See discussion supra at Part G 1.
280 Bankruptcy Law, supra note 264, art. 40.
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the debtor's insolvency is likely to exist.28 1 The Bankruptcy Law defines
"insolvency" in terms of ability to pay debts. A debtor is considered to be
unable to pay its debts when:
(1) it cannot respond to its obligations within 45 days from
the time they became due;
(2) it has stopped all payments during a continuous 30 day
period; or
(3) the debtor shows that it is probable that it will not be
able to pay existing obligations when they become
due.
282
Quite apart from the fact that these tests are inconsistent with the
threshold tests for bankruptcy under the Bank Bankruptcy Law, there is a
fundamental question as to whether anyone other than the NBS should be
allowed to petition the court to commence insolvency proceedings with respect
to a bank. The NBS, through its oversight role, is in a better position than the
bank's creditors or other public authority to know whether a banking
institution is viable.283 Putting this decision in the hands of any body other
than the bank supervisor is undesirable, because it removes the bank
supervisor from the decision as to which banks must exit the system.
The bank supervisory authority typically has better expertise than
creditors, judges, and other state bodies to evaluate the situation surrounding a
troubled bank and determine the best course of action. Due to its continual
supervisory function, the bank supervisor, as opposed to the courts, is already
in the possession of the necessary information about the bank, its business
structure and its operations. It also has the necessary technical expertise that
enables it to act more expeditiously. Given its expertise and proximity to the
financial sector, the bank supervisor is better placed to assess whether or not
specific measures are appropriate under the circumstances.284
For all of these reasons, it is therefore essential that the bank
supervisor have the exclusive authority to determine the conditions under
which banks will be forcibly liquidated or otherwise resolved. It seems likely
281 Id. at 12.
12Id. at art. 2
283 See HOpkes, Why a Special Regime, supra note 260, at 8.
284 Id.
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that this was the intent of the Serbian drafters, but it would be preferable if this
principle were expressly stated.2t 5
4. Who Oversees the Proceeding?
Unlike in an ordinary bankruptcy proceeding, a bankruptcy judge is
not used in bankruptcy proceedings involving banks.286 This suggests that the
Deposit Insurance Agency, as bankruptcy or liquidation administrator, carries
out the resolution process with relative autonomy, with the bankruptcy panel
serving as a referee in the event of dispute.287 However, the law never actually
states this.
The Bankruptcy Law calls for a "bankruptcy panel" consisting of
three judges.2 8 'This is an integral part of an ordinary bankruptcy
proceeding. 289 The Bank Bankruptcy Law does not mention this body, but
requires that there be a "bankruptcy council," without specifying this body's
composition, its duties or authorities. 29° Assuming that the bankruptcy council
under the Bank Bankruptcy Law is the same thing as the bankruptcy panel
under the Bankruptcy Law, a number of issues are present.
Ordinarily, one of the first steps in a bankruptcy case is a decision on
"preliminary proceedings," which is issued by the bankruptcy panel. This
entails submission by the debtor of relevant financial data291 and the institution
of security measures to prevent the destruction of records or the disappearance
of property.292 Preliminary proceedings can last a maximum of thirty days.293
Presumably these items do not apply in a case involving a bank since the court
is obliged to render a decision on instituting bankruptcy proceedings (not just
preliminary proceedings, but the full-blown bankruptcy proceeding) the next
285 Cf German Banking Act, supra note 67, §46b(1) (insolvency petition may
only be filed by the BAFin); Austrian Banking Act, supra note 124, § 82(1) (normally
only the FMA may apply for bankruptcy of a credit institution). The same logic, of
course, applies to other parties, such as the public prosecutor, public attorney, and tax
authority. The sole authority for determining when a bank should exit the system
should be the NBS.
286 Bank Bankruptcy Law, supra note 2, art. 19.
287 See id. at art. 11, point 7.
288 Bankruptcy Law, supra note 264, art. 10.
289 Id. at arts. 10, 11.
290 Bank Bankruptcy Law, supra note 2, art. 7, 1.
291 Bankruptcy Law, supra note 264, art. 46.
292 Id. at arts. 47, 48.
293 Id. at art. 53, 1.
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business day after receiving the NBS's decision. 294 This is nowhere expressly
stated, however.
Next, in an ordinary case, the bankruptcy panel appoints the
bankruptcy judge, but since there is no bankruptcy judge in a case involving a
bank, this would not be applicable. The panel also appoints and removes the
bankruptcy administrator,-95 but since the Deposit Insurance Agency functions
as the bankruptcy administrator in the case of a bank,296 this point is also not
applicable in a such cases. The panel also rules on objections against actions
of the bankruptcy administrator (again, the Agency in the case of a bank).297
Another function of the panel, issuing authorization in "singular
management," applies only to entrepreneur debtors, so this function would not
apply in the case of a bank. 298 The only other function of the panel is a catch-
all provision that it "performs other activities stipulated by [the Bankruptcy]
law., 299 Thus, out of a list of nine items, only three are really applicable in a
case involving a bank: determining whether there is sufficient reason for
opening the bankruptcy case, actually issuing the decision to open the case,
and ruling on objections to decisions taken by the Agency in its capacity as
bankruptcy administrator for the bank.30 0
In addition, the Bankruptcy Law subjects a number of the bankruptcy
administrator's functions to the approval or oversight of the bankruptcy judge.
For example, the consent of the bankruptcy judge must be obtained before the
bankruptcy administrator can act in the following circumstances: creating a
plan of the bankruptcy proceedings, including the estimated expenses and
timetable; insuring the property of the debtor entity; employing staff members
and supervising their work; ascertaining the validity, extent and priority of
claims presented by creditors; and preparing a draft main distribution of the
bankruptcy estate and the draft of the final bankruptcy balance.30 ' In addition,
the bankruptcy administrator may obtain unsecured credit or incur secured
debt on otherwise unencumbered assets or rights only after notifying the
bankruptcy 3judge and after obtaining the approval of the creditors
committee. 3°- The bankruptcy administrator must submit monthly reports to
294 Bank Bankruptcy Law, supra note 2, art. 6.
295 Bankruptcy Law, supra note 264, art. 11 (5).
296 Bank Bankruptcy Law, supra note 2, art. 7, 2.
297 Bankruptcy Law, supra note 264, art. 11(7).
298 Id. at art. 11(8).
299 Id. at art. 11 (9).
300 Id. at art. 11(2), (3) and (7).
301 Bankruptcy Law, supra note 264. art. 17,1 1, points 2, 6, 9. 10, and 12.
302 Id, at 2.
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the bankruptcy judge.3 °3 Since there is no bankruptcy judge in a proceeding
involving a bank, the question becomes, who performs these functions?
Logically, the answer should be the NBS, but an argument could be made that
it is the bankruptcy panel. Unfortunately, the law does not provide a clear
answer.
5. The Role of Creditors
The Bank Bankruptcy Law contains two contradictory provisions as
to whether a board of creditors is used in bankruptcy proceedings involving
banks. Article 7 states that it is, while Article 19 states that it is not.3 04 Query,
then, how to reconcile these provisions.
A plausible explanation is that the provisions of the Bankruptcy Law
regarding the creditors' committee do not apply to banks because there are
special provisions in the Bank Bankruptcy Law that govern creditors'
committees of banks and insurance companies. Yet the Bank Bankruptcy Law
includes only four references to a board of creditors, two of which entail cross-
references to the general Bankruptcy Law,3 °5 and the other two of which
merely acknowledge the existence of the board of creditors. 30 6 There is no
indication in the Bank Bankruptcy Law as to what the board of creditors
actually does. Presumably, then, the general Bankruptcy Law would apply,
and this is problematic. The Bankruptcy Law gives the creditors' committee a
huge amount of authority. For example:
303 Id. at art. 18, 8. See also id. at art. 12 (listing the functions of the bankruptcy
judge).
304 Compare id. at art. 7 (stating that bank bankruptcy proceedings must have a
bankruptcy council, a bankruptcy administrator, and a board of creditors) with id. at art.
19 (stating that unless otherwise prescribed by this Law, provisions of the Law
governing the bankruptcy of economic entities, except for provisions on previous
bankruptcy proceedings, bankruptcy judge, board of creditors and re-organization, shall
apply to bankruptcy proceedings of banks and insurance companies). See also id. at
art. 21. The Bankruptcy Law actually refers to a "creditors' assembly" and a "creditors'
committee," but does not mention a "board of creditors." This appears to be a
translation issue. It seems quite clear that the "board of creditors" referred to in the
Bank Bankruptcy Law is actually the "creditors' committee" under the general
bankruptcy law. This is so because the "creditors' assembly" in the general bankruptcy
law consists of all of the creditors, and thus its existence is not in doubt. See
Bankruptcy Law, supra note 264, art. 22, 2. The creditors' committee, by contrast, is
selected from among the creditors - in the case of ordinary enterprises, by the creditors'
assembly (See id. at art. 24), and in the case of a bank or insurance company, by the
bankruptcy council at the request of the Agency (see Bank Bankruptcy Law, supra note
2, art. 7, 3).
305 Bank Bankruptcy Law,. supra note 2, arts. 19, 21.
3 6 Id. at art. 7, . 3
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" Approval of the creditors' committee is necessary for
the bankruptcy administrator (in the case of a bank, the
Agency) to obtain unsecured credit or incur secured
debt on otherwise unencumbered assets or rights.3 °7
* Consent of the creditors committee is necessary for
actions undertaken. by the bankruptcy
administrator/Agency that have an impact on the
bankruptcy estate, such as obtaining credit or the selling
and purchase of the major part of the property ("actions
of crucial importance"). 30 8
* The creditors committee may submit an objection
against the final balance to the bankruptcy panel.30 9
* The creditors committee:
(1) gives its opinion to the bankruptcy
administrator[/Agency] on the manner of
selling the [debtor's property], if the property
will not be sold through a public auction, and
gives its consent on all important issues related
to the status of property, [such as] obtaining a
credit, [conducting] litigation of higher value,
giving a loan etc. in accordance with the
procedure set forth in [the Bankruptcy Law];
(2) gives its opinion on continuation of the
bankruptcy debtor's business operations;
(3) reviews the reports of the bankruptcy
administrator[/Agency regarding] the course of
the bankruptcy proceedings and the status of
the bankruptcy estate;
(4) reviews and requires, at its own cost, the
delivery of copies of complete documentation;
(5) informs the Assembly on its work, if requested;
[and]
307 Bankruptcy Law, supra note 264, art. 17(2).
308 Id. at art. 18(3).
309 Id. at art. 18(8).
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(6) [p]erforms other activities stipulated in the
law.
310
The creditors committee has the right to:
(1) submit a[n] [objection against] the work of the
bankruptcy administrator [/Agency] to the
bankruptcy judge and to the bankruptcy panel;
... [and] to submit a[n] [objection against] the
conclusions of the bankruptcy judge;
(2) appeal against the decision of the bankruptcy
judge and the bankruptcy panel, if the
possibility to appeal is allowed;
(3) review the court records, expert findings and
all other documentation of the bankruptcy
proceedings;
(4) provide its opinion on approving justifiable
losses that were encountered during the process
of [preparing] the inventory;
(5) propose the replacement of the bankruptcy
administrator and appointment of a new one
[presumably this would not apply in the case of
a bank, where the Agency must serve as the
bankruptcy administrator]; [and]
(6) give an opinion about the amount of the
compensation and expense reimbursement to
the bankruptcy administrator.
311
If the assets of the debtor include cash, securities or valuables,
consent of creditors' committee is necessary for the bankruptcy
administrator/Agency to decide on the manner of preserving or
investing them.
312
310 Id. at art. 27.
311 id.
312 Id. at art. 84(3).
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* The sale through direct agreement can be conducted only with
prior approval of the creditors' committee.313
* Approval of the creditors' committee is necessary for the
bankruptcy administrator/Agency to sell the entire bankruptcy
debtor as one legal entity, or to sell individual plants or units.31 4
* If the creditors' committee objects to the draft of the main
distribution, the bankruptcy panel holds a hearing to resolve the
objection.3 15
All of these items give the creditors much more authority than is
necessary or desirable in the case of a bank. The problem is that while
creditors' committees may be an acceptable mechanism for dealing with
bankruptcies of most kinds of commercial enterprises, they are not very well
suited to banks. Creditors' committees, by definition, are comprised of
individuals and representatives of creditor enterprises, each of which will,
understandably, pursue its own self-interest in attempting to realize the
maximum amount from the estate. Moreover, proceedings such as creditors'
meetings tend to lengthen bankruptcy proceedings, which can have an adverse
effect on the value of assets and destroy liquidity. 31 6 It is highly questionable,
therefore, whether a creditors' committee is necessary, or even desirable, in
the bank resolution context.
317
Concern for creditors' rights, which under general
bankruptcy/insolvency rules aim to maximize the return for creditors and to
ensure their fair treatment, must be qualified in the case of banks. The
principal objective of banking law is ensuring the stability of the financial
sector as a whole and to prevent systemic problems. Whereas the bankruptcy
administrator of an ordinary enterprise seeks to maximize assets in the interest
of creditors, the foremost objective for the administrator of a failed bank is to
minimize the impact of the bank failure on the banking system as a whole. In
addition to ordinary debtor/creditor interests, the legal regime for bank
313 Id. at art. 110(5).
314 Id. at art. 112(1). Note, however, that under the Law on Bank Bankruptcy,
sale of the bank or insurance company as a legal entity in the course of bankruptcy
proceedings is prohibited in any event (See Id. at art. 11), which is problematic for
other reasons.
315 Id. at art. 117(2).
316 See Hupkes, Bank Insolvency Resolution in Switzerland, supra note 260, at 16.
317 Cf Swiss Banking Act, supra note 67, art. 35, 1 (creditors' assembly is used
only if the liquidators appointed by the Banking Commission consider it opportune to
do so), 2 (the Banking Commission can, but is not obliged to, appoint a creditors'
committee).
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resolution must give a high degree of consideration to the public interest. This
requires a departure from the "pari passu" principle (equal treatment of all
creditors).318
6. Interaction Between Court Processes: Administrative and Commercial
Courts
The interaction between the provisions of the Banking Law on license
revocations, on the one hand, and judicial commencement of the bankruptcy or
liquidation process under the Bankruptcy and Bank Bankruptcy Laws, on the
other, is troublesome.
Under the current legal regime, the process of resolving a failed bank
potentially involves three separate court proceedings. When the NBS revokes
a bank's license, the bank can initiate administrative proceedings to seek
judicial review of that decision.3 19 In Serbia, this currently is undertaken by a
department of the Supreme Court.320 This is an optional proceeding that takes
place only if the bank chooses to appeal against the NBS's decision to revoke
the bank's license. This process is also reflected in the Bank Bankruptcy law,
which gives the bank the opportunity to seek review of the NBS' decision on
318 Htipkes, Why a Special Regime, supra note 260 at 12. Policy issues aside,
there are some drafting problems that render the above provisions questionable. For
example, the creditors committee, or any creditor affected by the actions referred to in
paragraph 3 of Article 18 (regarding actions of the bankruptcy administrator) may bring
an objection to the bankruptcy judge. Id. at art. 18(3). Likewise, the president and
members of the creditors committee have a right to reimbursement of necessary
expenses actually incurred, which are determined by the bankruptcy judge. Id. at art.
28(1). Since there is no bankruptcy judge in a proceeding involving a bank, who would
make these determinations? Presumably the bankruptcy panel, but the Law does not
actually state this. See discussion supra at Part G 4..
319 Serbian Banking Law, supra note 1, art. 9, 5.
320 Currently, the Supreme Court has a department that considers appeals from
final decisions of administrative bodies. See Law on the Organization of Courts, RS
Official Gazette Nos: 46/91, 60-91, 18/92, and 71/92, art. 39 (2002); Republic of
Serbia Ministry of Justice and Ministry of Interior, Policy Paper for Donor
Coordination Meeting 24 (November 18, 2003). Pursuant to amendments to the Law
on the Organization of Courts (effective January 1, 2007), the Administrative Court
(which was originally established in 2002) will have original jurisdiction in cases
arising from decisions of administrative bodies. See Id. at art. 26. The Supreme Court
will hear appeals from the Administrative Court's decisions. See Serbia and
Montenegro Investment Climate, available at
http://www.buyusa.gov/yugoslavia/en/71.html (last visited Mar. 11, 2007).
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meeting the conditions to institute the bankruptcy process. 32' The court is
obliged to render its decision within sixty days of receipt of the complaint.322
A second judicial review proceeding is possible if the NBS revokes a
bank's license, but determines that the criteria for bankruptcy are not satisfied.
According to the Bank Bankruptcy Law, the prescribed course of action in this
situation is enforced liquidation.- Article 9 of the Banking Law allows the
bank to seek judicial review of this decision.324 Assume that the bank does
initiate this procedure and loses in the Supreme Court or administrative court.
Suppose further that the liquidation administrator (the Deposit Insurance
Agency) later determines that the bank's assets are not sufficient to settle all
creditors' claims, and that the criteria for bankruptcy are present after all and
that the NBS agrees with this determination.325 According to Article 5 of the
Bank Bankruptcy Law, the bank has the right to challenge this decision,
despite the fact that it had already lost one appeal: Article 5, after all,
expressly states that the bank can seek review of the NBS's decision on
meeting the requirements to initiate bankruptcy proceedings - it does not
address a decision to revoke a license where liquidation, rather than
bankruptcy, is undertaken in the first place.3 26 When it is considered that there
is no real difference between bankruptcy and liquidation - the bank is
liquidated in any event - it is clear that the second proceeding is unnecessarily
duplicative.
327
The third proceeding, which always takes place, entails a
328determination by the competent court to commence the bankruptcy process.
The competent court for bankruptcy and liquidation matters is the Commercial
Court. 329 The time period in which the NBS is required to forward its decision
to the court to commence this process is not stated in the Law, but the NBS is
required to render the decision on fulfillment of conditions for initiating
bankruptcy proceedings over the bank immediately upon rendering the
decision on revocation of the bank's operating license, or, at the latest, on the
day following the day of receipt of a proposal regarding the liquidation
321 Bank Bankruptcy Law, supra note 2, art. 5, $ 1.
322 id. at 2.
323 Id. at art. 3, 2.
324 See Serbian Banking Law, supra note 1, art. 9, 5.
325 See Bank Bankruptcy Law, supra note 2, art. 4, 2.
326 Id. at art. 5, 11.
327 See discussion supra at Part G 2.
328 See Bank Bankruptcy Law, supra note 2, art., art. 6.
329 Law on the Organization of Courts, supra note 320, art. 24, T 4.
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administrator. 330 The court is obliged to make a decision on the bankruptcy no
later than the first business day following receipt of the NBS's decision.
331
These time frames are rather problematic. If the NBS files its
decision with the commercial court immediately following the license
revocation resolution, and the court has to render a decision within one day,
there is a possibility that the commercial court could render a decision before
either of the judicial review proceedings described above (assuming they have
been initiated) has run its course. The commercial court could thus decide to
commence the liquidation or bankruptcy process, only to have the Supreme
Court (or administrative court) later cancel the NBS's resolution on license
revocation or the bankruptcy determination. Depending on what stage the
resolution process was in, this could require the Agency to "unscramble the
eggs," by reversing a number of the steps that have already been taken.
Clearly, this is not a good scenario. On the other hand, the commercial court
could refuse the NBS's petition, even if the Supreme Court or administrative
court ultimately rejects the bank's petition for review. In this scenario, the
result would be a non-functioning "former bank" that could not be wound up.
Neither of these scenarios is feasible or desirable. (Again, however, the
alternative is liquidation, but this is also problematic, as the following
paragraph points out).
An additional issue is the incompatibility between the two sets of
proceedings. As we have seen, the NBS must, or may, revoke a bank's license
in a number of circumstances. 332 Some of these are due to extreme financial
difficulties, and some are due to other factors, such as lack of ownership
transparency, fundamentally untrustworthy management, and so forth.
333
Bankruptcy proceedings, on the other hand, require not only that a bank's
license has been revoked, but that the bank has been illiquid for fifteen days,
or that its liabilities exceed its assets. 334 A bank not meeting one of the two
latter criteria cannot be adjudged bankrupt. In this scenario, the prescribed
course of action is liquidation; 335 but since liquidation is only one type of
bankruptcy proceeding 336 and, thus, presumably requires a bankruptcy
determination by a competent court, a defunct bank's affairs cannot be wound
up without a judicial determination of bankruptcy in any event. Thus, where a
330 Bank Bankruptcy Law, supra note 2, art. 4.
131 Id.at art. 6.
332 Serbian Banking Law, supra note 1, art. 130.
333 Id.
334 Bank Bankruptcy Law. supra note 2, art. 2.
331 Id. at art. 3, 2.
336 Bankruptcy Law, supra note 264, art. 1, 2.
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de-licensed bank does not meet the bankruptcy criteria, the result could be a
state of perpetual limbo.
A more synchronized approach would be helpful, which would tie the
timing of the commercial court's decision on the NBS's bankruptcy petition to
the Supreme Court's (or administrative court's) determination on the bank's
petition for review (if any). Briefly stated, the process could work as follows:
(1) The bank would have a short period of time (say, ten
days) to file a petition for review with the Supreme
Court (or administrative court as of 2007). The
Supreme Court or administrative court would be
required to make a decision on the petition within a
specified time period after receiving it (say, thirty days).
(2) The bank should have only one opportunity to submit a
petition for judicial review, not two. The appropriate
reference is Article 9 of the Banking Law. Once the
NBS determines that a bank's situation is sufficiently
serious that it needs to be wound up, this should be the
only reviewable issue. The only question for the court
should be whether or not there were legal grounds to
revoke the bank's license. Once that question is
answered affirmatively, the bank resolution process
should commence. The bank should not be given a
second opportunity, as Article 5 of the Bank Bankruptcy
Law now provides, to seek judicial review of the NBS's
determination that the bank fits the criteria for
bankruptcy where it has already had that opportunity in
connection with the license revocation/liquidation
decision.
(3) The distinction between "bankruptcy" and "liquidation"
should be eliminated, as it is a distinction without a
difference. 33 7  Liquidation should be simply one
possible option under the "bank resolution" umbrella,
along with mergers, purchase-and-assumption
transactions, the creation of a bridge bank, and others.338
The word "bankruptcy" does not need to be used in the
case of a bank.
337 See discussion supra at Part G 2.
338 See discussion infra at Part G 10.
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(4) The NBS would not petition the commercial court to
commence the resolution process until after the judicial
review process had run its course (or until the expiration
of the ten-day appeal period, if no petition for review is
filed within that time). With a short enough time frame
for the judicial review process, this should not cause
undue delay. In the meantime, the bank would be under
the control of a temporary administrator appointed by
the NBS.
(5) The commercial court would be required to set a date to
consider the NBS's petition within a short time period
(say, not later than three business days) from the day the
petition is filed.
As is readily apparent, the commercial court's role should be narrow
and mechanical. There is virtually no substantive role for the commercial
court to perform. All the commercial court needs to do is confirm that the
bank's license has indeed been revoked, and that there are no pending appeals.
In short, granting the NBS's petition to commence the resolution process
should be routine and automatic.
Clearly, the commercial court should not have to independently
determine the existence of facts upon which the bank resolution process can be
undertaken; the revocation of the bank's license by the NBS should provide
the all the grounds that are necessary for this decision., The facts supporting
that decision should be contained in the administrative record, and should be
considered by the Supreme Court, not the commercial court.
If the bank seeks judicial review of the National Bank's license
revocation decision and loses, then clearly it should not be able to present
those arguments again to the commercial court. The case is even stronger if
the bank does not choose to seek judicial review at all. In this scenario, the
bank clearly should not have the ability to "resurrect" in the commercial court
the same arguments that it could have, but did not, pursue in the Supreme
Court when it had the opportunity.
7. Is Commercial Court Involvement Really Necessary?
The above discussion, of course, presupposes that there is a
significant role for the commercial court in the bank resolution process.
However, it also raises the question of whether involvement of the court is
even necessary in the first place. The above discussion points out the dangers
inherent in this approach, mainly stemming from the possibility of inconsistent
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decisions in the Supreme Court (on one of the bank's petitions for judicial
review) and the commercial court (on the National Bank's bankruptcy filing).
At the very least, the prospect of three court proceedings dealing with
essentially the same substantive issue is duplicative and wasteful, even if the
eventual decisions are completely consistent.
Moreover, with the commercial court's role being so routine and non-
substantive, it is highly questionable whether the commercial court needs to be
involved at all. Where there is no petition for judicial review on the license
revocation issue (or where the bank has filed a petition and lost), there is
absolutely no meaningful role for the commercial court to perform: the license
has indeed been revoked, the bank has no valid reason for preventing the
resolution process from going forward, and there is no good reason not to
undertake that process. It does not make sense to waste the commercial
court's time "rubber-stamping" the NBS's petition when there is no
substantive role for it to perform.
In this author's view, Serbia would do well to adopt a purely
administrative approach, under which judicial involvement would be limited
to:
* review by the Supreme Court (or the Administrative
Court, beginning in 2007) of the NBS's decision to
revoke a bank's license, if a petition for such review is
filed by the bank; and
" resolving disputes that may arise in the course of the
resolution process (a function that could be carried out
by either the commercial court or the administrative
court).
Such an approach would make a good deal of practical sense. First,
because of their limited experience in the bankruptcy area, the Serbian courts
have little expertise in this field even in the case of ordinary enterprises.
339
Considering that resolution of banks present even more challenges than those
of ordinary enterprises, the case for administration by a specialized body such
as the deposit insurance agency is even stronger. Second, the vast majority of
things that happen in a typical bank resolution are not inherently "judicial" and
339 See Serbia-Montenegro Investment Climate, supra note 320. An additional
issue is the perceived level of corruption in the Serbian commercial courts. See Moma
Ilic and Dragana Nikolic-Solomon, Anti-corruption Arrests Divide Serbia, Anti-
Corruption Gateway for Europe and Eurasia (April 2006), available at
http://w-w.nobribes.org/en/default.asp?ed=27&cat-4&id = 1 754&cid=23.
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do not require the involvement of a court. Examples include approving and
reviewing ordinary (and even extraordinary) expenses, reviewing a proposed
method to sell assets, approving a list of undisputed claims, disbursements,
etc. Where court action is contemplated, the key questions are: 1) is it really
only a judicial issue being decided (that is, is there a legitimate legal dispute
that only a judge has the expertise to decide; and 2) does it unnecessarily stall
the process?
8. Mergers of Problem Banks
As noted above, it is also possible for a defunct bank to be taken over
by a healthy bank. Article 134 of the Banking Law allows a bank to submit to
the NBS a request to assume the rights and obligations of a bank undergoing
liquidation and/or bankruptcy proceedings.340 This is arguably broad enough
to encompass traditional methods of problem bank resolution that are now
commonly used in more advanced countries, such as purchase-and-assumption
transactions, or supervisor-encouraged mergers and acquisitions,3 41 though the
exact structure in Serbia raises some issues. The procedure for applying for
and receiving such approval in the case of a defunct bank are identical to those
that apply to mergers of healthy banks, and are found in Article 133 of the
Banking Law.
342
A bank that wishes to "absorb" another bank must submit a request
for consent to the NBS. The bank submitting the request must amend its
founding act so as to:
(1) State the amount of its total share capital in pecuniary
and non pecuniary form after the absorption, as well as
each founder's stake in share capital;
(2) State that it is the legal successor of all the rights and
obligations of the bank that is absorbed to it.
343
The package of information must include:
(1) Amendments to the founding act;
(2) Bank's assembly decision on the acceptance of the
absorption;
340 Serbian Banking Law, supra note 1, art. 134.
341 See discussion infra at Part G 10.
32 Serbian Banking Law, supra note 1, art. 133.
3 Id. at art. 133.
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(3) Decision of the assembly of the bank which is absorbed
to it on the absorption;
(4) Analysis of economic justifiability of the absorption,
drafted based on the most recent statements which the
banks submitted to the National Bank of Serbia in
compliance with Article 51 of [the Banking] Law;
(5) Analysis that the respective absorption cannot have any
negative consequences on the situation in the financial
market, and/or violate competition, as specified in
Article 7 of [the Banking] Law.3 44
The NBS may give such consent only if:
(1) the absorption does not jeopardize financial condition of
[the absorbing bank];
(2) [the absorbing bank] has such system of organization,
managing, decision making, and information technology
that ... [will] enable it to completely integrate the bank
which is to be absorbed to it into its system, in a way so
as not to jeopardize its functioning;
(3) The absorption is economically justified and/or will not
have negative consequences on the situation in the
financial market nor does it violate [the anticompetition
provisions of Article 7.]345
While the current scheme is written in a "voluntary" manner, there
certainly is room for the NBS to use its powers of "moral suasion" to
encourage mergers between healthy and "troubled-but-salvageable" banks.
3 46
Still, the "all or nothing" approach to assuming the rights and obligations of
the target bank can have the effect of limiting options. Also, as explained
below, some additional options would be helpful.
344 id.
345 Id.
346 See Margery Waxman, A Legal Framework For Systemic Bank Restructuring
(World Bank, 1998).
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9. Receivership and Conservatorship
The Serbian Banking Law contains a provision on receivership.
347
This is very different from the receivership concept in the United States, which
is part of the overall bank resolution process, and is more akin to
"conservatorship" or temporary management.
The NBS may introduce receivership in a bank if:
(1) [it] establishe[s] [that the] bank is acting in breach of
regulations or standards of safe and sound banking
business activities, that have jeopardized its. financial
condition;
(2) the bank fails to carry out [the requirements of a
corrective order issued under] Article 116 of [the
Banking] Law within the time period;
(3) [the bank's] financial situation deteriorates during the
period before the deadline for carrying out [an Article
116 order].348
A requirement for instituting receivership is that the NBS determines
that a change in manner of management of a bank might eliminate
irregularities in its business activities and improve its financial situation, and
that the bodies and management of the bank cannot carry out such change.
349
The receivership process entails the appointment of two official
receivers, who must be persons independent of the bank and have good
business reputation and adequate qualifications. 350 When the official receivers
are appointed, the functions of the bank's board of directors and executive
board are transferred to them.351 The official receivers are not obliged to act
according to decisions of the bank's assembly if they assess that such
decisions will not contribute to the improvement of the bank's financial
situation.3 52 The official receivers may call the bank's assembly and suggest
rendering of certain decisions. These decisions are submitted to the bank's
assembly and have the same legal effect as decisions rendered by the bank's
assembly. If the bank's assembly refuses to adopt the decisions of the official
347 Serbian Banking Law, supra note 1, art. 117.
34 8 Id. at I 1.
'49 Id. at 2.
350 Id. at 11 3, 4.
311 Id. at 1 6.
352 Id. at 1 8.
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receivers, such decisions may be rendered by official receivers, with consent
of the NBS.35 3 In performing their activities, official receivers must follow
instructions of the NBS, and inform it at least once a month of the business
activities of the bank that is under receivership. 354 Official receivership may
be terminated prior to the specified deadline if the official receivers or the
NBS assess that the introduction of receivership has not caused an
improvement of the bank's financial situation, or that the financial situation of
that bank has improved so that the official receivership is no longer needed. 
355
The key difference between receivership in the United States and
Serbia is that in the former case, the receiver completely takes over the bank
and the shareholders lose their ownership rights; 356 in Serbia, by contrast,
receivership is considered a temporary corrective measure (as evidenced by
the fact that it is actually located in the general enforcement section of Chapter
V of the Banking Law, on the NBS Supervisory Function, rather than in
Chapter VI, on Cessation of Bank Operations). Nevertheless, the concept has
considerable potential for use in the bank resolution process. In fact, the
receivership process (or, more accurately, the conservatorship or temporary
administration process) is actually better suited to that purpose.
First, it is highly questionable whether a supervisory authority should
physically operate a bank with a view toward turning it around and returning it
to the owners and managers who caused the problems in the first place. A
strong argument can be made that responsibility for the safe and sound
operation of a bank rests with the bank's owners, through the directors and
managers appointed by them; if the bank's managers are unable, or unwilling
to do this, the best course of action is to take the bank from their control and to
place it with different owners and managers, or if this is not feasible, to
liquidate it.
Second, using receivership as a temporary management improvement
tool rather than as a step in the ultimate bank resolution process can actually
impede a successful outcome. For one thing, the requirement that shareholder
approval be sought for major items such as restructuring or reorganization can
have the effect of delaying the process. While Article 117 does provide that
the official receivers and the NBS can choose to implement proposed
decisions that the shareholders reject, the fact remains that the process will be
more costly and time-consuming if the shareholders must be involved. Where
a bank is on the verge of failure, the requirement of full shareholder
113 Id. at 9.
151 Id. at 10.
315 Id. at 11.
356 See 12 U.S.C. §1821(d)(2)(A)(i).
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participation can even make that failure more likely.35 7 For another, this form
of receivership can encourage duplicative judicial proceedings, which are
time-consuming and expensive. Because it is viewed as a general enforcement
function and not part of the overall bank resolution process, the bank's owners
have a reasonably good argument that they should have the right to two
opportunities to seek judicial review - one when the receiver is appointed, and
again when the bank's license is actually revoked.
The solution to this problem that was adopted in the savings and loan
context in the United States was to preclude judicial review in certain
circumstances. Under this approach, the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS)
may appoint the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) as either
"conservator" or "receiver" for an insured savings association when certain
conditions are met (and is actually required to do so if the bank becomes
critically undercapitalized). 358 As a practical matter this has the same effect as
revoking the institution's license in many other countries, although the United
States does not use the "license revocation" terminology. 359 The grounds for
appointing a conservator or receiver are identical. 360  The vast majority of
powers of a conservator and receiver are also identical, with two main
exceptions: the FDIC as receiver can actually liquidate the institution, which
it cannot do when it is a conservator.36 1 Conversely, as conservator the FDIC
has the authority to take steps "to put the institution in a sound and solvent
condition and preserve its assets and property," powers that are not mentioned
in the receivership role.362 In either case, however, the conservator or receiver
takes over all of the rights and powers of the stockholders, members, directors
and officers of the institution, i.e., both conservatorship and receivership wipe
out the shareholders' ownership interests.
363
357 Id.
358 See 12 U.S.C. § 1464(d)(2)(A), incorporating the conservatorship and
receivership grounds of section 1 1(c)(5) of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, 12
U.S.C § 1821(c)(5).
359 Conservatorship is rarely used in the United States anymore. The purpose is
to buy some time for the bank supervisor while it decides on the best course of action
for the bank. But much the same thing can be accomplished under receivership or with
the "bridge bank" concept, which entails the initial appointment of a receiver for the
defunct bank and uses the conservatorship technique only to manage the bridge bank
for a limited period of time. See infra at Part G 10.
360 12 U.S.C. § 1821(c)(5).
361 id. at § 182 1(d)(2)(E).
362 Id. at § 1821 (d)(2)(D).
363 Id. at §1821(d)(2)(A)(i) (FDIC, as conservator or receiver, succeeds by
operation of law to all rights, titles, powers, and privileges of the insured depository
institution for which it has been appointed, and of any stockholder, member,
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After the FDIC has been appointed as conservator or receiver for an
insured savings association, the institution can petition the court for judicial
review of this decision.36 In addition, the OTS can take a decision to replace
the conservator with a receiver (again, in either case, it is the FDIC, so this is
just a matter of changing the FDIC's function from that of a conservator to that
of a receiver). 365 This decision is not subject to judicial review.366 This
reflects the legal and policy approach that in the United States, conservatorship
is seen as simply an initial step in the overall resolution process, rather than as
367a more temporary enforcement measure.
accountholder, depositor, officer, or director with respect to such institution). See also
12 U.S.C. § 1464(d)(2)(E)(ii) (FDIC as conservator or receiver for a savings
association has all of the powers of a conservator or receiver under the FDIA).
364 12 U.S.C. § 1464(d)(2)(B).
365 Id. at § 1464(d)(5)(C).
366 Id. at § 1464(d)(5)(D). See Franklin Savings Association v. OTS, 35 F.3d
1466 (10, h Cir. 1994).
367 Strictly speaking, the described scenario applies only in the savings
association context. The situation with regard to national banks and state-chartered,
federally-insured banks is a bit more complicated. The FDIC may appoint itself as
conservator for an institution in the latter category. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(c)(4). The
institution may seek judicial review of this decision within thirty days. 12 U.S.C.§
1821(c)(7). The FDIC may replace itself as conservator with itself as receiver. 12
U.S.C. § 1821(c)(8)(A). Both the HOLA and the FDIA contain provisions limiting
judicial review in this situation, but they differ slightly. The HOLA quite clearly states
that except as otherwise provided, "no court may take any action for or toward the
removal of any conservator or receiver or . . . to restrain or affect the exercise of
powers or functions of a conservator or receiver." 12 U.S.C. § 1464(d)(5)(D) (emphasis
added). The FDIA, on the other hand, contains a nearly identical section, but leaves out
the italicized passage. See 12 U.S.C. § 18210). It could therefore be argued that a
state-chartered bank can challenge the replacement of the conservator with a receiver,
since the FDIA does not contain the same kind of limiting language that the HOLA
does. On the other hand, both the FDIA and the HOLA give the institution the right to
challenge the appointment of the conservator or receiver; neither gives it the right to
challenge the replacement of a conservator with a receiver. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1821(c)(7),
1464(d)(2)(B). See Franklin Savings, supra note 366 at 1470. Moreover, both statutes
specifically provide that the replacement of a conservator with a receiver does not
affect the institution's right to challenge the original appointment of the conservator.
12 U.S.C. §§ 1464(d)(5)(C), 1821(c)(8)(C). With regard to national banks, the picture
is even murkier. The Bank Conservation Act, 12 U.S.C. §201 et seq. (2000) authorizes
the Comptroller to appoint a conservator for a national bank on the grounds contained
in the FDIA. 12 U.S.C. § 203(a). Judicial review may be sought within twenty days. 12
U.S.C. § 203(b). The Act authorizes the Comptroller to replace the conservator with
another conservator, but unlike the situation with the OTS (regarding savings
associations) or the FDIC (regarding state-chartered banks), does not mention replacing
the conservator with a receiver. Compare 12 U.S.C. § 203(e) with id. §§1464(d)(5)(C)
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In preparing future amendments to the Banking Law, Serbia would do
well to eliminate the concept of "rehabilitation-oriented" receivership, and to
focus on receivership (or conservatorship) as part of the overall bank
resolution process. In essence, the focus should be on preserving the assets of
the failed bank and preventing their disappearance until a solution can be
determined. In so doing, it should consider adding some provisions to the
existing ones.
Currently the law provides that on the day of rendering the resolution
on revocation of the bank's operating license, the NBS will block all of the
bank's accounts, and simultaneously declare a prohibition on disposal of the
bank's property until the initiation of bankruptcy proceedings and/or
liquidation.368 Transactions undertaken in violation of this prohibition are
considered null and void.369 While these measures are clearly necessary, they
are not sufficient by themselves to prevent asset dissipation. First, blocking
the bank's accounts is only helpful for payments that are made through the
NBS; for international payments, where the bank might use a foreign
correspondent bank rather than the NBS, the blocking process is not helpful.
Second, blocking the accounts will not prevent the disappearance of other
kinds of assets, whose transfer is not affected by the payment mechanism.
Finally, simply prohibiting property disposals is unlikely to deter anyone who
is really intent on effectuating them. Even deeming the transaction to be null
and void does not fully address the problem of unwinding the transaction once
the money is out the door. While it might be possible to recover some or all .of
the funds under the law's prohibited preference provisions, it is far more
efficient to prevent their occurrence in the first place.37 °
and 182 l(c)(8). The Comptroller may terminate the conservatorship of a national bank
upon the appointment of a receiver under the National Bank Receivership Act, 12
U.S.C. § 191. See 12 U.S.C. § 205(b). The latter statute makes no provision for
judicial review of receivership appointments. Such appointments are therefore subject
to review in accordance with the Administrative Procedure Act. See James Madison
Ltd., by Hecht.v. Ludwig, 82 F.3d 1085, 1094 (D.C. Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S.
1077 (1997). A national bank could, therefore, make a fairly persuasive argument that
the "replacement" of a conservator with a receiver really is not a "replacement" at all,
but rather an "appointment" of a receiver which is subject to judicial review. While the
policy issues are identical in all three cases, the statutory language is explicit only with
regard to savings associations. A federal court may well decide the issue the same way
in the bank context, but this issue apparently has never been adjudicated.
368 Serbian Banking Law, supra note 1, art. 130, 5.369 Id. at 6.
370 Additionally, while the Bankruptcy Law provides for putting temporary
measures in place to preserve the debtor entity's assets before a determination is made
on the bankruptcy petition, Bankruptcy Law, supra note 264, art. 47, this applies in the
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The law should therefore provide that simultaneously with revoking
the bank's license, the NBS would appoint a conservator for the bank. The
conservator should take complete control of the bank and its assets.37' Ideally,
the Deposit Insurance Agency should be the conservator. The conservator
should stay in place until a determination is made as to the most appropriate
course of action for the bank (which will normally entail a purchase-and-
assumption transaction, merging the bank with another bank, or, if one of
these alternatives is not feasible, liquidation). Also, the conservator should
remain in place until any judicial review process is complete, otherwise the
possibility of asset-stripping would be enormous. The conservator should also
make a complete assessment of the financial condition and future prospects of
the bank, and make a recommendation to the NBS and the Deposit Insurance
Agency.
Shifting the focus from "rehabilitation-oriented" receivership to a
regime that is merely a step in the overall bank resolution process would also
likely minimize the possibility of judicial interference in the process. As Dr.
Hfipkes points out, there is a real danger that actions taken by a provisional
administrator can be nullified if they run counter to shareholder wishes, unless
the provisional administration is clearly structured so that it is part of the
larger resolution picture. This is illustrated by the case of Panagis Pafitis and
Others v. Trapeza Kentrikis Ellados AE and Others,32 in which the European
Court of Justice (ECJ) considered the applicability of the EU Second
Company Law Directive to the actions of a provisional administrator that had
been appointed for a bank by the Central Bank of Greece. The provisional
context of "preliminary proceedings," and there is a real question as to whether this
concept is even applicable to banks. See discussion supra at Part G 4. It is true that the
court is obliged to make a decision on instituting bankruptcy proceedings no later than
the next business day after receiving the NBS's decision, but.the problem is that
financial assets can disappear in a matter of minutes.
371 Compare 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(2). In practice, in the United States, when a
federal banking agency takes over a bank, it sends a team of examiners, attorneys and
other resolution-oriented personnel to the bank without any prior notice, often near the
close of business on a Friday afternoon. The necessary papers are executed within
minutes, and the existing senior management team is dismissed. The resolution team
works through the weekend to secure the bank and inventory its assets (down to such
mundane things as arranging to change the locks on the doors and to have new security
passes issued to those trusted employees who are being retained). The successor bank
(often a bridge bank or similar entity) then opens for business on Monday morning
under the auspices of the FDIC as conservator. The bank's customers barely notice the
difference. This brief summary is based on the personal experience of the author, who
participated in many closings of insolvent savings and loan associations during the
1980s and 1990s.
372 Case No. C-441/93 (1996).
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administrator had decided on a capital increase without a decision of the
general assembly of shareholders. The ECJ held that member states must not
adopt bank reorganization measures that violate the minimum level of
protection for shareholders, and held that any changes in the capital structure
of a banking corporation without a resolution of the general meeting were
contrary to Article 25(1) of the Directive. As Dr. Hfpkes notes, however, the
case might well have turned out differently if the appointment of the
provisional administrator had occurred in the context of formal bank resolution
proceedings, which, as a general rule, entail the divestiture of the shareholders'
ownership rights.
373
While the current Serbian Banking Law allows official receivers
appointed by the NBS to override the decisions of bank shareholders with
regard to "certain decisions" (without specifying what those decisions are), 374
there is a real question as to whether this provision would withstand a legal
challenge if Serbia were eventually to realize its EU membership ambitions.
Clearly, the NBS would be in a stronger position if: 1) the grounds for
instituting receivership were the same as for revoking a license; and 2)
fundamental reorganization was included in the category of "certain decisions"
that could be implemented without shareholder approval.
10. Bank Reorganizations
Currently, the reorganization concept does not apply to banks whose
licenses have been revoked.375 Yet, in some cases, this may be the wisest
course of action. Mergers arranged by the NBS or the Deposit Insurance
Agency, purchase-and-assumption transactions,376 the possibility to create a
373 Htipkes, Why a Special Regime, supra note 260, at 21.
374 Serbian Banking Law, supra note I, art. 117, 9.
375 Bank Bankruptcy Law, supra note 2, art. 19.
376 See 12 U.S.C. §1821(d)(2)(G). A "Purchase and Assumption" (P&A)
transaction is the most often used final solution to resolving failing banks in the United
States. It is essentially a closed bank merger, in which a healthy bank agrees to assume
the deposit and other liabilities of a failed bank in return for its good assets and cash or
notes from the government (usually the deposit insurer). Usually healthy banks are not
interested in taking over distressed assets even at heavily discounted prices. They are
usually also reluctant to take over some assets that the government considers not to be
distressed, at least not without some loss protection. A P&A transaction can be
structured so that the public authority (again, normally the deposit insurer) agrees to
provide funds to buy a failing bank's distressed and questionable assets at their
estimated fair value and the government regulatory body, such as the deposit insurer,
provides the assistance necessary to fill any remaining shortfall between assets and
liabilities (i.e., to bring the bank's capital level up to zero). This is usually cheaper than
a deposit payout via straight liquidation. See generally FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE
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"bridge bank, 3 77 selling off parts of the distressed bank, debt-for-equity
swaps, and recapitalization by new or possibly existing shareholders, could all
be part of the picture.
378
To accomplish this in the most efficient manner, the receivership
provisions should be restructured as outlined above. Two approaches are
possible. First, the official receivers could take control of the bank upon
revocation of the license and succeed to the ownership rights of the
shareholders (as in the United States). 3 79 They would thus unquestionably
have the authority to carry out a reorganization of the bank without
shareholder approval.3 80
The alternative approach entails essentially keeping the existing
structure, but amending the grounds for instituting receivership so that they are
identical to those for revoking the bank's license. In this way, there would be
no question that receivership was part of the overall bank resolution process.
In essence, receivership would be treated as a temporary alternative to license
CORPORATION, RESOLUTIONS HANDBOOK Ch. 3 (2003), available at
http://www.fdic.gov/bank/historical/reshandbook/index.html.
... See 12 U.S.C. § 1821(n). A bridge bank is, essentially, a limited life, full
service bank that takes over the assets and liabilities of a failed bank. The basic
purpose is to provide time to structure a final solution - usually a purchase-and-
assumption transaction. The bridge bank operates under the direction of the deposit
insurer and provides basic and essential banking services, but operates conservatively,
accepting deposits and making low-risk loans to regular customers. Its management
goal is to preserve the franchise value of the bank and to minimize any disruption to the
local community. Existing shareholders and other subordinated claims are left behind
as claims against the fai led bank's estate. They only receive payments to the extent
that any funds are left after a final resolution and repayment of any government funds.
Bridge banks were developed in the U.S. in late 1980s to resolve large and complex
failing banks. Early bridge banks often involved the consolidation of multiple failing
banks into one bridge bank. The Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) used a very
similar concept during the savings and loan crisis in the 1980s and early 1990s. The
principal difference between the true bridge bank approach, as the FDIC originally
conceived it, and the OTS variation is that in the latter case, the OTS would often
create a single successor institution to replace a single failed savings association. The
new institution would be managed by the Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC) as
conservator until a long-term solution could be found. An example of the legal
documentation for creating a new federally-chartered savings association under the
auspices of the OTS can be found at the official OTS website,
http://www.ots.treas.gov/docs/r.cfm?61056.pdf.
378 See Httpkes, Bank Insolvency Resolution in Switzerland, supra note 260 at 13-
15.
319 See 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(2)(A)(i).
380 See 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(2)(G).
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revocation and liquidation, and could be used to buy some time for the NBS to
work out an appropriate course of action. The official receivers could have
the authority to propose reorganizations to the shareholders, as is the current
practice; the difference would be that if the shareholders rejected the
reorganization plan, the NBS would unquestionably have the authority to
revoke the bank's license and order its liquidation.
This is essentially the approach taken in Switzerland under the 2003
amendments to the Banking Act. The new Swiss regime allows for a financial
restructuring to be undertaken outside of the framework provided under
general corporate law. If a bank encounters serious financial difficulties, but
the Banking Commission determines that there are reasonable prospects for a
reorganization of the bank, the Commission can defer revoking the bank's
license and can appoint an administrator, who is charged with the development
of a reorganization plan for the bank.381 In the meantime, the bank's business
may be continued on a reduced scale under the guidance of the administrator
and the Banking Commission.3 82 The reorganization plan can impose changes
to the capital structure of the bank, and as in the United States, the law makes
clear that the plan is not subject to shareholder approval.383  Unlike the
American -approach, however, in Switzerland there is no temporary ownership
of the bank by a public authority. This reflects the Swiss belief the bank
supervisor should not be involved in the day-to-day business of running banks
and that, therefore, bank reorganization should as a matter of principle be left
to the private sector. There is also a concern that direct government
involvement in the reorganization process could expose the State to significant
liability risk. Finally, there is concern that direct governmental involvement
could also lead to a "moral hazard" problem by creating the expectation that in
case of unsuccessful management and failure to return the bank back to
solvency, the government would guarantee all additional losses suffered by the
creditors.384 The shareholders and creditors can raise objections to the plan,
and if a majority of creditors (excluding secured and certain other privileged
creditors) oppose the plan, the Banking Commission orders the bank
liquidated.385 In the absence of this, however, in the end it is the Banking
Commission, rather than the shareholders, that has the authority to decide
whether to accept the plan.
381 Swiss Banking Act, supra note 67, § 28, 1.
382 Id. at 2.
383 Id. at art. 29, 3.
384 See Htipkes, Bank Insolvency Resolution in Swvitzerland, supra note 260 at 13-
14. 385 Swiss Banking Act, supra note 67, art. 29, 2, art. 30.
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Clearly, the NBS has learned much from the experiences of other
countries, and has made a gallant effort to adopt and implement the best
examples of legal provisions that have worked well in those countries. The
influx and influence of foreign banks should do much to speed the
development of the Serbian banking sector and encourage its integration into
the wider European financial world. Many of the provisions recently adopted
in the 2005 Banking Law are already being practiced by commercial banks
and bank supervisors in the European Union and among members of the Basel
Committee. The new Banking Law provides a golden opportunity for the
NBS and Serbian banks to follow suit.
Equally plain, much remains to be accomplished. The law is only a
roadmap, and the implementation task will be neither easy nor painless. This
article has tried to point out some of the areas in which further work is needed.
Bank corporate governance is an area that deserves much more attention, in
practice if not necessarily in further legal amendments. Consolidated
supervision is a new and unfamiliar area, and will need much intense focus as
the NBS evaluates the situations of banks that are parts of wider corporate
groups. A subset of this topic involves mixed-activity groups, which pose
significant risks to banks and which the NBS cannot afford to ignore. Finally,
while Serbia has made some significant improvements to its problem bank
resolution regime, a number of clarifications are in order.
Even with the changes in the legal text suggested here, there will still
be much to do. Bank examiners and offsite analysts will need further training
and mentoring on how to implement supervision based more on judgment and
critical analysis than on straightforward criteria, as was the case in the past.
And, of course, the support of the judiciary will be critical. For risk-based
supervision to be effective, the courts must give the bank supervisory authority
a wide "margin of appreciation" to fashion policies and remedies under
flexible, indefinite legal provisions such as "safety and soundness," "good
business reputation," and so forth.38 6 It remains to be seen how well the
Serbian courts will react to this new legal terminology.
Finally, dealing with the financial sector is only one of the many
issues with which Serbia is still forced to contend. Rebuilding from years of
conflict, capturing the remaining war criminals, and resolving the status of
Kosovo, are all critical to the country's future.
386 For a detailed discussion of these issues in transition economies, see Gary A.
Gegenheimer, Judicial Review of Bank Supervisoiv Decisions in the Former Soviet
Republics: The Case of Kyrgyzstan, 25 ANN. REV. BANKING AND FIN. L. 295 (2006).
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None of these observations, of course, should obscure the fact that
Serbia has made some great strides in just a few years. The dedication and
perseverance of the NBS lawyers, supervisors and senior officials during the
drafting and review process was nothing short of remarkable. It was an honor
and a privilege to work with them.
Nearly a decade ago, following a year as resident legal advisor to the
National Bank of Kazakhstan, this author wrote: "To study the transformation
of a region can be intellectually stimulating, but to actually participate in that
transformation is positively exhilarating. . . . [T]he experience was at once
challenging, fascinating, occasionally frustrating, humbling, and most of all,
enormously rewarding." 387 Those emotions remain every bit as strong today
as they were ten years ago.
387 See Gary A. Gegenheimer, Bank Regulatory Reform in the Republic of
Kazakhstan, 17 ANN. REv. BANKING L. 153. 212 (1998).


